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O'Connor: Asocial Media: Cops, Gangs, and the Internet

NOTE

ASOCIAL MEDIA:
COPS, GANGS, AND THE INTERNET
I. INTRODUCTION

Criminal street gangs are not a new phenomenon in America,1 but
recent developments in technology and social interactions have changed
the game-gangs are increasingly using social media to accomplish
gang objectives and commit crimes.2 This is no secret to law

1.

See G. DAVID CURRY & ScoTT H. DECKER, CONFRONTING GANGS: CRIME AND

COMMUNITY 13 (1998). While there is some disagreement among scholars as to exactly when gangs
first emerged in the United States, it is generally accepted that they have been operating here since
at least the nineteenth century. Compare id at 13-14 (asserting that youth gangs have existed in the
United States since at least the 1870s), with JOHN T. WHITEHEAD & STEVEN P. LAB, JUVENILE
JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION 96 (7th ed. 2013) (claiming that the first youth gangs emerged as early
as 1783. For more information about the emergence of gangs in the United States, see TYLER
ANBINDER, FIVE POINTS: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK CITY NEIGHBORHOOD THAT
INVENTED TAP DANCE, STOLE ELECTIONS, AND BECAME THE WORLD'S MOST NOTORIOUS SLUM

31 (2001) (discussing the earliest known account of American gang activity-as reported in The
Herald in March 1836-which described a gang assault allegedly perpetrated by the infamous
Bowery Boys gang in New York City).
2.

See, e.g., NAT'L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., NATIONAL GANG THREAT ASSESSMENT:

EMERGING TRENDS 11, 41 (2011) [hereinafter THREAT ASSESSMENT], available at
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/201 1-national-gang-threat-assessment201 I-nationalgang-threat-assessment-emerging-trends ("Gangs are becoming increasingly savvy and are
embracing new and advanced technology to facilitate criminal activity and enhance their criminal
operations."). The National Gang Intelligence Center's 2011 report, National Gang Threat
Assessment: Emerging Trends ("ThreatAssessment"), attributes a recent surge in gang membership
to "the facilitation of communication and recruitment through the Internet and social media." Id.at
11. The Threat Assessment further asserts that social media has "made gang activity more prevalent
and lethal" by providing an especially accessible avenue for gang members to "intimidate rivals and
police, conduct gang business, showcase illegal exploits, and facilitate criminal activity"-all of
at 41-42; see also Scott Gutierrez, Street Gangs Using Internet
which can lead to violence. See id.
for Violent Bragging Rights: Masked Hoodlums Making Threats at MySpace, Other Sites,
SEATTLEPI.COM (July 9, 2006, 10:00 PM), http://www.seattlepi.comlocal/article/Street-gangsusing-lntemet-for-violent-bragging-1208477.php (indicating that as many as eight years ago, gang
experts and law enforcement officials across the country had become deeply concerned by the
growing presence of gang activity online, particularly on MySpace); Thomas Watkins, Gangs'
Use of Twitter, Facebook on the Rise, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2010, 2:24
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/02/gangs-use-of-twitter-facebook_n 445551 html
PM),
(reporting law enforcement's estimation in 2010 that "gangs are making greater use of Twitter and
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enforcement. In fact, police departments and prosecutors regularly use
the Internet and social media networks to obtain incriminating evidence

against gang members--evidence that is often ruled admissible in court.
Although the majority of the information seized in these investigations is
highly personal and profoundly private, the details of the government's
specific data-collection and data-storage practices remain shrouded in
secrecy due to a glaring lack of regulation and transparency. Such
Facebook, where ....they can make threats, boast about crimes, [and] share intelligence on
rivals
....[but that] the much-older MySpace ...remains gang members' online venue of choice").
3. See, e.g., People v. Liceaga, No. 280726, 2009 WL 186229, at *3.4 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan.
27, 2009) (upholding the admission of a MySpace photo to identify defendant, who was depicted
holding the murder weapon and "'throwing' a gang sign"); INT'L Ass'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE,
SOCIAL MEDIA SURVEY RESULTS (2013) [hereinafter IACP SURVEY], available at
http://www.iacpsociahnedia.org/Portals/l/documents/2013SurveyResults.pdf (detailing a survey of
five hundred law enforcement agencies, spanning forty-eight states, in which 86.1% of the surveyed
agencies reported using social media for criminal investigations, and 80.4% reported that social
media has helped them solve crimes); Beth C. Boggs & Misty L. Edwards, Does What Happens on
Facebook Stay on Facebook? Discovery, Admissibility, Ethics, and Social Media, 98 ILL. B.J. 366,
367-69 (2010) (noting that a court will typically admit online information into evidence without any
special consideration or heightened scrutiny, but the determination of whether such information is
discoverable is hardly well settled or well defined, as courts have struggled to uniformly decide
discoverability disputes); George W. Knox, Gang Members on Facebook: Should We Look the
Other Way?, NAT'L GANG CRME RES. CENTER, http://www.ngcrc.com/gangface.html (last visited
Jan. 2, 2014) (describing the relative ease with which investigators can utilize Facebook to identify
and surveil gangs and other groups that present a security threat); John Lynch & Jenny Ellickson,
Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Presentation to Computer Crime & Intellectual Prop. Section:
Obtaining and Using Evidence from Social Networking Sites (Aug. 2009) [hereinafter Obtaining
Evidence],
available at https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/socialnetwork/
and Using
20100303 _crimsocialnetworking.pdf (revealing that federal law enforcement agencies regularly
obtain personal information online).
4. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protectionfor Stored
E-Mail, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 138 ("People reveal in their e-mails more about their political
opinions, religious beliefs, personal relationships, intellectual interests, and artistic endeavors than
they ever revealed over the telephone [and] ....[s]tored e-mails, in particular, contain a vast
archive of people's past activities."); Boggs & Edwards, supranote 3, at 367 ("A surprising number
of people are shockingly candid when posting to their public profile on a social networking site.");
T.C. Sottek, NSA Used PRISM to Collect More than 200 Million Internet Communications a Year
as of 2011, VERGE (Aug. 21, 2013, 4:24 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/8/21/4645042/nsaprism-internet-communication-collection-200-million-fisc-order. Writing for The Verge, T.C.
Sottek revealed that the National Security Agency ("NSA")--purportedly targeting terrorist
activity-secretly "collect[ed] private electronic data of users from services like Gmail, Facebook,
Outlook, and others," including "incidental data belonging to innocent Americans with no
connection to terrorism." Sottek, supra (internal quotation marks omitted); see also infra Part I
(detailing the clandestine and officious data-collection practices of the NSA and other government
agencies). Thus, in the course of a legitimate Internet investigation, the government can collect (and
store) law-abiding citizens' private information without their knowledge, even though these citizens
have little to no connection to the class of crimes that allegedly triggered the initial investigation.
See Sottek, supra; see also Roger Yu, Social Media Role in Police Cases Growing, USA TODAY,
Mar. 19, 2012, at 11 B (quoting Lieutenant Lisa Thomas of the Cincinnati Police Department, who
stated in 2012 that the department's Real Time Crime Center was "looking [on social media
networks] at friends and friends of friends of the suspects" (emphasis added)). According to an
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clandestine government policies create a slippery slope-one that could
potentially transform the American society into a dystopia.5
It appears that law enforcement primarily gathers gang-related

online data in two forms: (1) evidence of past, present, or impending
gang crime; and (2) evidence of an individual's affiliation, or even mere
association, with a particular street gang.6 Social network administrators
are aware of the growing trend of gangs' increased use of the Internet.7
Some social media networks have implemented easy-to-use reporting
policies to allow users (and some non-users) to notify network
administrators of users' improper or illegal "abuses." 8 The administrator
article by Roger Yu, Cincinnati's Real Time Crime Center ("RTCC") "monitor[s] the Internet and
the cameras installed across the city." Yu, supra. In one reported instance, the RTCC was
scrutinizing social media accounts to uncover information about the suspects of an ongoing criminal
investigation. Id. While examining the suspects' Facebook pages, as well as the pages belonging to
the suspects' "friends and friends of friends," RTCC analysts uncovered evidence of an unrelated
(and undisclosed) crime when they "stumbled upon an online video... showing an act of armed
robbery, helpfully taped by the perpetrators themselves." See id Yu notes that the aggregate number
of online investigations conducted by the Cincinnati Police Department remains unknown, as are
the specific details regarding the precise nature and extent of online investigations, the department's
storage (and destruction) practices, and the regularity with which police investigate suspects'
associations-such as family, friends, and friends of friends. See id Due to the current lack of
regulation and transparency surrounding such law enforcement practices, citizens will likely never
know whether the government has collected and stored their personal information-or, even, if they
were ever surveilled by the government. See Sottek, supra; Watkins, supra note 2 (relating law
enforcement's remarkable reluctance to discuss specific details of online investigations of gang
activity).
5. See infra Part III.
6. See Liceaga, 2009 WL 186229, at *3-5 (admitting a MySpace photo, which prosecutors
used to identify defendant and establish his gang involvement, into evidence); Kathryn Kinnison
Van Namen, Comment, Facebook Facts and Twitter Tips-Prosecutors and Social Media: An
Analysis of the ImplicationsAssociated with the Use of Social Media in the ProsecutionFunction,
81 MISS. L.J. 549, 552-53, 563-65 (2012) (indicating that various district attorneys and police
departments have their own Facebook accounts, which they use-in part-to encourage citizens to
provide "tips" about past, pending, and imminent crimes in their communities, and to evaluate
suspects' and witnesses' personal associations and affiliations; investigate criminal activity; and
prosecute gang members); infra Parts III.C-IV.A; see also IACP SURvEY, supra note 3 (noting that
80.4% of surveyed police departments reported "that social media has helped [them] solve crimes in
their jurisdiction," and that 66.1% reported using social media for "intelligence" purposes).
7. Knox, supra note 3 (contrasting the approaches used by MySpace and Facebook in
addressing social media gang activity). MySpace allows any person with Internet access, even one
without a MySpace account, to report "gang-related language and/or images," which are prohibited
by its "explicit guidelines." Id Moreover, MySpace enforces a zero-tolerance policy for violations
of its anti-gang "terms of use." Id. Facebook, on the other hand, has adopted a "laissez faire"
attitude; it provides no mechanism "to report that a violent criminal street gang is gang-banging on
Facebook." Id.Although hands-off reporting policies-such as those employed by Facebookallow nefarious gang activity to persist online, they actually benefit law enforcement by increasing
the amount of available gang intelligence, since gang members are permitted to remain active on the
networks. Id.(demonstrating how a laissez-faire reporting policy can serve as a boon to online gang
investigations).
8. See id.
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of the network then examines the reported content, evaluates it, and
determines whether to close the user's account and remove the content
from the website. 9 In some instances, information is voluntarily shared
with law enforcement. 10 However, these policies are often vague and far
from transparent. 1
Courts, for the most part, find few problems with admitting
evidence recovered under such circumstances, as long as it is
relevant, 2 authenticated, 13 and otherwise admissible.' 4 Notably,
9. See id.
10. See Obtaining and Using Evidence, supra note 3; Yu, supra note 4 (reporting that
Facebook shares information with authorities to prevent fraud and other illegal activities, but refuses
to elaborate on its information sharing practices).
11. See Knox, supra note 3.
12. Boggs & Edwards, supra note 3, at 369; see, e.g., People v. Liceaga, No. 280726, 2009
WL 186229, at *3.4 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2009); see also FED. R. EVID. 402 (stating that
evidence must be relevant in order to be admissible at trial). Evidence is relevant if: "(a) it has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the
fact is of consequence in determining the action." FED. R. EviD. 401. Evidence of gang affiliation
gathered from social media can been found relevant as, for instance, such evidence may tend to
identify a particular defendant in a criminal case. See, e.g., Liceaga, 2009 WL 186229, at *3.4
(holding that MySpace photos of defendant holding a gun and "'throwing' a gang sign" were
relevant in identifying defendant as the shooter and in tending to prove his familiarity with the
murder weapon, where the defense theory was an accidental discharge of the firearm); see also Eric
Tucker, Don't Drink and Drive, Then Post on Facebook, MSNBC (July 18, 2008, 1:37 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/25738225/?GTI=43001#.UwFCgvldXeU (describing cases where
judges were swayed to impose stiff prison sentences on drunk-driving defendants after prosecutors
presented photos from social media websites depicting the defendants-after their arrests-abusing
alcohol, disrespecting the court, or showing an overall lack of remorse for their crimes).
13. See Heather L. Griffith, Note, Understanding and Authenticating Evidence from Social
Networking Sites, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 209, 217-23 (2012). Photographic and video
evidence from social networking sites is particularly vulnerable to authenticity attacks. See id. at
222-23; see also Zachariah B. Parry, Note, Digital Manipulation and Photographic Evidence:
Defrauding the Courts One Thousand Words at a Time, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 175, 18283 (illustrating the ease with which photographic evidence can be manipulated). Further, the person
portrayed online may not be the real person-in fact, the "real person" may not even be real. See
Manti Te'o Girlfriend Lennay Kekua Was a Man, CHtCAGONOW (Jan. 25, 2013, 7:17 AM),
http://www.chicagonow.comlmayor-daily/2013/0l/manti-teo-lennay-kekua-696. Many states have
passed laws criminalizing the impersonation of another online due to the serious nature of the
potential consequences of such conduct-that is, the embarrassment and humiliation that arises
when such impersonation is revealed, or, conceivably, the stress of criminal investigations and
prosecutions based upon falsified social media evidence. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(a)(d) (West Supp. 2013) (providing that "any person who knowingly and without consent credibly
impersonates another actual person through or on an Internet Web site or by other electronic means
for purposes of harming, intimidating, threatening, or defrauding another person is guilty of a public
offense," and subject to fines of one thousand dollars, one year in jail, or both). However, many
courts do not seem to be concerned with authentication and impersonation issues as they relate to
criminal investigations. See Aviva Orenstein, Friends, Gangbangers,Custody Disputants,Lend Me
Your Passwords, 31 MiSS. C. L. REV. 185, 212-15 (2012). For a more thorough discussion of the
authentication issues surrounding evidence obtained from social media, see id at 202-21.
14. See, e.g., Van Namen, supra note 6, at 565 (asseverating that most courts admit relevant
evidence regardless of its online form). But see, e.g., Justin P. Murphy & Matthew A.S. Esworth,
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however, law enforcement is not necessarily breaking any specific laws
through its current investigative and data-mining practices., 5 But,
perhaps it should be.
This Note argues that law enforcement is properly using social
media to investigate active cases and past crimes, and, when brought to
its attention, to prevent imminent crime.' 6 However, law enforcement is
dangerously toeing the line of constitutionality by collecting the personal
data of non-suspects (and their purported affiliations or associations with
a gang), and congressional guidance is needed to monitor these
Orwellian practices. 7 Since its sweeping, secretive data-collection
practices were revealed in 2013, the National Security Agency ("NSA")
has become the center of a maelstrom of controversy and polemic public
debate.' 8 The Planning Tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization,
and Management ("PRISM") tool-an NSA electronic surveillance
program-exemplifies the type of government monitoring activities that
urgently need transparency and regulation to give effect to the Fourth
Amendment's protections against unwarranted and unreasonable
searches and seizures. 19 Accordingly, this Note focuses on the
government's unregulated digital surveillance of suspected gang
members and their associations, and the potential chilling effect that
such practices may have on the First Amendment rights to free speech
and association.20
Part II of this Note will provide background regarding gang culture
and gang members' migration to social media; a basic understanding of
gang norms and common practices is helpful to illustrate the volume of
incriminating evidence that social media contains.2' Part III describes the
The ESI Tsunami: A Comprehensive Discussion About Electronically Stored Information in

Government Investigations and Criminal Cases, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2012, at 31, 31 (surmising that
courts have provided "little guidance" regarding electronically stored information).
15.
16.
17.

See infra Parts III.C-IV.A.
See infra Parts I-IV.
See infra Parts 111-1V; see generally GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949)

(describing a hypothetical future where all citizens are constantly monitored by a totalitarian
government that sees and knows all).
18. See Sottek, supra note 4.
19.

See infra Parts III-IV.

20. See infra Parts II-IV.
21. See infra Part II. Gang members' conduct is often driven by the desire to display certain
coveted characteristics that are uniquely defined by gang culture; for instance, the highly valued
attribute "toughness." See Walter B. Miller, Lower Class Culture as a Generating Milieu of Gang
Delinquency, J. Soc. ISSUES, Aug. 1958, at 5, 5-9. The desire to appear tough is inextricably
intertwined with the common gang practice of "representing"-displaying one's gang affiliation, as
prompted by a sense of deviant duty and passionate pride, through the use of various "identifiers"
such as graffiti, hand signs, symbols, clothes, and dance-and, more recently, through boasts of
gang crimes on social media. Id. at 7-18; see SANYIKA SHAKUR, MONSTER: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY
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current state of the law with respect to online gang investigations by
reviewing statutes permitting law enforcement to obtain electronic data
from social media administrators and Internet Service Providers ("ISPs,"
singularly "ISP"); court decisions upholding the admission of social
media evidence in gang prosecutions; and relevant scholarly
commentary on these issues.22 This Part also discusses the absence of
statutory authority permitting the data-mining practices and online
surveillance of suspected gang members and their families and friends,
setting the stage for Part IV.23 Part III further illuminates how the lack of
legislative guidance and the related lack of transparency from law
enforcement create a dangerously cavalier scenario that is rife with
potential constitutional violations.24 In this vein, Part III analyzes
relevant constitutional protections as they relate to the collection of data
on gang members not formally accused of crimes-with particular
attention to the freedom of association25-as well as the collection of
data with respect to suspects' friends and families.26 Part III also
addresses current investigative techniques, whether by law enforcement
agencies or prosecutors, as well as the widely disparate reporting
policies of various social media networks.27
Part IV.A asserts that the current shadowy state of the law
regarding law enforcement's investigations and data-collection
procedures leads to unbridled surveillance practices that lurk
precariously close to the point of violating the Constitution.28 To resolve
this, Part IV.B proposes a federal statute that requires uniform reporting
procedures for social media that would allow evidence of gang-related

OF AN L.A. GANG MEMBER 169 (1993); David Ddcary-Hdtu & Carlo Morselli, Gang Presence in
Social Network Sites, 5 INT'L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 876, 879-80 (2011); Gutierrez, supra note 2
(reporting the widespread use of social media as an avenue for gang members to brag about crimes);
see also HOMEFRONT PROTECTIVE GROUP, TODAY'S GANGS: HOW TO RECOGNIZE THE SIGNS

(2006), available at http://www.shannonscomer.com/downloads/GangAwareness.pdf.
22. See infra Part Ill; see also Brian Hyer, Note, ProtectingJohn Doe: A New Standardfor
John Doe Subpoenas that Respects the Right to Speak Anonymously Online, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 495, 496, 498-99 (2011) (referring to ISPs as "the purveyors of online speech" and "tools of
First Amendment expression").
23. See infra Part III. Similarly problematic is the lack of scholarly commentary on the issue.
See infra Parts II-III.
24. See infra Part 11.
25. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("It is beyond debate that freedom to
engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the
'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces
freedom of speech.").
26. See infra Part ll.
27. See infra Part I.C.
28. See infra Part TV.A.
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crime to be communicated to the administrator. 29 The administrator
would then be directed to follow internal procedures and potentially
notify law enforcement if the evidence of a crime is credible.3 ° But
social media networks' policies must be clear, which the proposed
legislation will ensure.31 The proposed statute further grants law
enforcement the positive authority to collect data from social media
administrators and the individual users' ISPs, 32 if there is probable
cause 33 to believe that a crime has occurred, or there is a reasonable
probability of "imminent lawless action. 34 The statute explicitly
prohibits data-collection based on a user's mere affiliation or association
with a gang or gang member. 35 This comports with the freedom of
association, and, thus, the statute should be upheld if challenged on
such grounds.3 6

As discussed in Part IV, state legislatures could use the federal
statutes as models to draft their own state-specific regulations, and,
perhaps, provide their citizens with additional privacy safeguards, as
states may grant their respective citizens rights that extend beyond those
provided by the federal government.3 7 Similarly, state officials could
issue executive orders directing state law enforcement authorities to act
within the confines of the proposed federal statute. 3' The state executive
orders could instruct the relevant agencies to promulgate additional
safeguards by creating unambiguous policies and procedures within and
among the various departments. 39 Likewise, a state executive, such as
the attorney general, could issue a report urging the legislature to enact
statewide laws to comply with the federal statute proposed herein.4 °
29. See infra Part V.B.
30. See infra Part V.B.
31. See infra Part V.B.
32. See infra Part IV.B.
33. The statute requires a higher standard of proof for evidence of criminality that is gathered
from social media websites and other online sources due to the inherently unreliable nature of
Internet evidence, and the significant authentication issues surrounding electronic evidence in
general. See infra Part IV.
34. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969) (per curiam); infra Parts llA, IV.B.
35. See infra Part V.B.
36. See infra Parts ll.B, IV.B.
37. See infra Part IV.B. This is the case because the federal government sets the minimum
amount of citizens' rights, and therefore states may extend to their citizens additional rights and
privileges, so long as they comply with the federal minimum. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2; see also
YALE KAMISAR ET AL., BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 25 (13th ed. 2012).

38. See infra Part IV.B (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2).
39. See infra Part V.B.
40. See infra Part V.B. This may be proper if the state legislature does not immediately pass
legislation mirroring the proposed federal statute. Again, these state executive orders could even
urge state legislators to stretch beyond the limits provided by the federal statute, in order to provide
that state's citizens with additionalprivacy rights. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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Part V encourages more scholarly commentary on the issue of gang
investigations conducted through social media channels. 4' The lack of
specific legislation addressing this issue is one of the main problems in
this arena, as this absence cultivates a headstrong atmosphere among the
law enforcement authorities that investigate gang members (and lawabiding citizens) online.42 This cavalier atmosphere is cluttered with the
clouds of brewing constitutional violations,43 and the need to rein in
police and prosecutors through statutory regulation is great. 44
II.

GANGS IN AMERICA AND THE RISE OF SOCIAL MEDIA:

FROM THE STREET CORNER TO THE FACEBOOK WALL

Anything from wallbangin' (writing your gang name on a wall,
advertising)to spitting on someone to fighting-it's all work. And I was
a hardworker.
- Sanyika
Shakur, Monster. The Autobiography of an L.A.
45
Member
Gang
Gangs and gang crime pose serious threats to the safety and
46
security of our nation. As the fabric of our society evolves, social
interactions among teens and youth have migrated from the playground
to the computer screen; and, accordingly, so have gangs and gang
members. 47 Gangs' online activities have, naturally, expanded the scope
48nkonntr
of law enforcement's Internet investigations. But, the unknown nature
and extent of the personal data collected-and how that data is both
gathered and stored-potentially violate paramount protections of
privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. 49 An understanding of the anti41. See infra Part V.
42. See infra Parts III-V.
43. See infra Parts III-V.
44. See infra Parts III-V.
45. SHAKUR, supra note 18, at 52.
46. THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 9 ("Gangs are expanding, evolving and posing an
increasing threat to [U.S.] communities nationwide .... [and] are responsible for an average of 48
percent of violent crime in most jurisdictions and up to 90 percent in several others ... "). This
assessment estimates that there are currently 33,000 gangs with over 1.4 million gang members
nationwide. Id.
47. See id. at 27, 41-42 (contending that "advanced technology, such as wireless
Internet... has made the recruitment, collaboration, and coordination of criminal activity more
efficient and lucrative, and allows direct contact between the gangs and [drug trafficking
organizations]").
48. Seeid. at 27, 41-42.
49. See infra Parts HIIV. This is particularly true where the government collects the personal
data of gang members without proper suspicion of criminal activity, or when the scope of an
investigation extends to law-abiding citizens who happen to be (even tangentially) affiliated with a
suspect. See infra Part IlI. The unwarranted invasion of privacy, and the government's intrusion into
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social traits and values that permeate gangs and plague their members
will help demonstrate why gangs have migrated to the virtual world,
which has ultimately led to the problem at hand.5 °
Part ILA will provide general background regarding gangs and
gang culture. 51 Part II.A will also articulate several of the main
objectives and values that gangs typically harbor.5 2 Part II.B will focus
on the advent of the Internet and the rapid migration of gangs from street
comers to Internet caf6s,53 and will demonstrate how gang culture on the
Internet and social media has become prevalent, which has forced law
enforcement to expand the scope of its online investigations of gangs
and suspected gang members. 4
A. Gangs and Gang Culture
While there is some debate as to when gangs first emerged in the
United States,55 the general consensus is that Irish immigrants in the
Five Points neighborhood of New York City formed the earliest gangs in
the 1800s; these immigrants banded together for protection and as a
means of survival. 56 As time went on, the primary ethnic identity of
citizens' online personas, infringe upon the bedrock of our free and autonomous society. See infra
Parts III-IV.
50. See infra Parts II-III.
51. See infra Part H.A.
52. See infra Part I.A.
53. See infra Part I.B.
54. See infra Part I.B; see also infra Part III.C (discussing in detail the government's online
investigation tactics).
55. See infra Part I.B; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text. There are many
definitions of the term "gang." Compare BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 331 (4th Pocket ed. 2011)
(defining a gang as "[a] group of persons who go about together or act in concert, [especially] for
antisocial or criminal purposes," and explaining that "[m]any gangs have common identifying signs
and symbols, such as hand signals and distinctive colors"), with FREDERICK M. THRASHER, THE
GANG: A STUDY OF 1313 GANGS IN CHICAGO 46 (abridged ed. 1963) (defining a gang as "an
interstitial group originally formed spontaneously and then integrated through conflict," which,
essentially, can be any group of youth that form together and engage in mischief). For the purposes
of this discussion, the term "gang" refers to large, organized groups--such as the Bloods and
Crips-that utilize explicit by-laws, gang rituals, and/or identifying colors and symbols, rather than
loosely-organized groups of youth who socialize and commit crimes. For simplicity, this Note
defers to the government's definition of the term "gang" in the U.S. Code, which defines a criminal
street gang as "an ongoing group, club, organization, or association of five or more persons.., that
ha[s] as [one] of their primary purposes the commission of... criminal offenses." 18 U.S.C.
§ 521(a)(A) (2006). In this context, the U.S. Code defines "criminal offenses" as: "(1) a Federal
felony involving a controlled substance"; "(2) a Federal felony crime of violence that has as an
element the use or attempted use of physical force against the person of another"; and "(3) a
conspiracy to commit an offense described in paragraph (1) or (2)." Id. § 521(c).
56.

See HERBERT ASBURY, THE GANGS OF NEW YORK: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE

UNDERWORLD 1-2, 26-27 (Thunder's Mouth Press 2001) (1928) (providing a concise historical
overview of the evolution of the American street gang, beginning with the era of the Five Points
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gangs evolved from Irish to Italian, then to Jewish, and, finally, to
African-American. 7 Like the gangs of yesteryear, most modem gangs
are predominantly composed of youth, and are generally located in
densely populated urban areas.58
Gangs exhibit attributes of a culture separate and distinct from
mainstream society. 59 Within this gang subculture, there are several
norms and values that are, as one scholar posits, absent from mainstream
society, but, instead, are "absorbed from the culture of the lower class." 6 °
These include: (1) toughness; (2) trouble; (3) autonomy; (4) excitement;
(5) smartness; and (6) fate. 61 These seemingly simple terms warrant
further explanation, as they represent meanings in this context that are
quite different from their colloquial counterparts.
The term "toughness" does not merely refer to physical strength or
athletic ability. 62 Rather, the term refers to the need to "stand up to

adversity"-what Walter Miller describes as "whatever the street brings
(for example, run-ins with other gangs and the police). 6 3 Gang culture,
Miller explains, is "preoccup[ied] with getting into, or staying out of,
trouble"; and "trouble" itself "refer[s] to violent situations or interactions
with the police. ' '64 In today's world, these interactions can, and often do,
occur within the realm of social media-for instance, when members of
one gang threaten rivals with violence. 65 "Autonomy," in this context,
means "[t]he intolerance of challenges to one's personal sphere-the
need to stand up to anything or anyone., 66 The concern for "autonomy"
accounts for gang members' reluctance to resort to legitimate authorities
neighborhood in New York City); see also supra note 1.
57. See James C. Howell & John P. Moore, History of Street Gangs in the United States,
NAT'L GANG CENTER BULL., May 2010, at 1, 1-4, available at http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/

Content/Documents/History-of-Street-Gangs.pdf (describing the emergence, evolution, and ethnic
character of street gangs in the northeast and New York City).
58. See, e.g., id. at 9, 15 (providing examples of gangs primarily composed of youth,
discussing urban areas that are riddled with serious gang problems, and considering various causes

of gang activities, such as youth unemployment).
59.

See Miller, supra note 18, at 6-14 (discussing the focal concerns of the lower class life of

which gangs are a part).
60.

GENNARO F. VITO & JEFFREY R. MAAHS, CRIMINOLOGY: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND

POLICY 159 (3d ed. 2012) (discussing the views of a renowned gang researcher, Walter Miller, and
applying them to modern street gangs); see Miller, supra note 18, at 15 ("Focal concerns of the male

adolescent comer group are those of the general cultural milieu in which it functions.").
61.
62.

Miller, supranote 18, at 7-13.
VITO & MAAHS, supra note 60, at 159; Miller, supranote 18, at 9.

63. VITO & MAAHS, supranote 60, at 159; see Miller, supra note 18, at 9.
64.
65.
66.

Vrro & MAAHS, supra note 60, at 159; see Miller, supranote 18, at 8.
See infra Part II.B.
VITO & MAAHS, supra note 60, at 159; see Miller, supra note 18, at 12-13. Today, this

personal sphere extends to one's online persona-no longer are threats and intimidations made
solely on the streets; they are now issued across social media networks as well. See infra Part H.B.
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to deal with crimes-specifically violent crimes-that were committed
against them or directed at their respective gang.67 Instead, gangs
and gang members prefer to settle such disputes autonomously, on
their own.68
"Excitement" can be viewed in terms of the ordinary definition of
the word, in that gang members perceive life as "all about the thrill";
however, their thrill-seeking activities tend to focus on "flirting with
danger" and "engaging in conflict," a far departure from the forms of
excitement entertained by law-abiding citizens. 69 Likewise, the term
"smartness" does not refer to traditional measures of intelligence, such
as IQ; rather, "smartness" denotes "street smarts"-an asset to which
gang culture assigns a "high value. 70 In other words, a gang member
must be able to "handle oneself on the street."'', In today's world, the
"street" has extended beyond the pavement into the blogosphere. 72 It
follows that gang members must be capable of adequately responding to
intimidation and threats from rival gang members across social media
outlets, otherwise they will suffer the repercussions of being viewed as
weak-that is, unable or unwilling to properly represent and defend their
gang and its values.73 Finally, Miller uses the term "fate" to convey the
notion, common among gang members, that "whatever happens is meant
67.
68.
69.
70.

See VITO & MAAHS, supra note 60, at 159; Miller, supranote 18, at 12-13.
See VITO & MAAHS, supra note 60, at 159; Miller, supra note 18, at 12-13.
VITO & MAAS,supra note 60, at 159; see Miller, supra note 18, at 10-11.
VITO & MAAHS, supra note 60, at 159; Miller, supra note 18, at 9-10. One collateral

consequence of the social media revolution is that the "street" is no longer confined to the pavement

and playground. See supranote 2 and accompanying text; see also Van Namen, supra note 6, at 555
(analogizing social networks to "the new public square"). Thus, today's gang members likely strive
to possess and portray the "smartness" to act (and react) accordingly-they must be able to "handle
[themselves]" not only on the street, but also online. See THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 11,
41-42 (confirming that gang members have extended their enterprises to cyberspace, and that they
successfully use the Interet and social media to further their devious endeavors); VITO & MAAHS,
supra note 60, at 159 (defining "smartness" as the ability to "handle oneself on the street"); Miller,
supra note 18, at 7-13 (demonstrating that gang members exert great effort to evince the attributes
of gang culture, which preponderate all other values and goals). Today's gang members assert these
aberrant attributes by creating online personas that allow them to represent their particular gang's
values and norms, attack rival gang members' reputations and "toughness," respond to similar
affronts to their own reputations or "toughness," and, as law enforcement has observed, plan,
execute, and brag about crimes. See THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 41-42; Miller, supra
note 18, at 7-13.
71. VITO & MAAHS, supra note 60, at 159; see also Miller, supra note 18, at 9-10 (contending
that smartness is "highly valued" among gang members, and that "[t]hose who demonstrate
competence in this skill are accorded considerable prestige"). The ideal gang leader will combine
both smartness and toughness, but smartness is considered to be more valuable in gang culture,
"reflecting a general ... respect for 'brains' in the 'smartness' sense." Miller, supra note 18, at 10.
72. See Gutierrez, supranote 2; Watkins, supra note 2; see also text accompanying note 2.
73. See VITO & MAAHS, supra note 60, at 160; Miller, supra note 18, at 15 (discussing that
adherence to these values is important to maintaining status); infra Part HI.A.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2013

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 9

658

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 42:647

to be" 74-- a belief that contributes to the impetuous, reactive nature of
gang members, and the contagious, retaliatory violence that plagues
gangs in American neighborhoods.7 5
B. The Advent of the Internetand the Migrationof Gangs Online
With the advent of the Internet, gangs quickly transformed their
76
activities and objectives from the street corner to the computer lab.
Today, gangs are so prevalent on the Internet-engaging in activities
such as recruiting, bragging about recent crimes, and even planning
criminal activities-that law enforcement has dedicated significant
resources toward the online investigation of gangs and gang members.77
These tactics are being used by both state and federal law enforcement

74. VITO & MAAHS, supra note 60, at 159; Miller, supranote 18, at 11-12; see supranote 18.
Professors Erick Barnes and Robert Homant elaborate on Miller's "fate" concern through the socalled "Valhalla Effect." Telephone Interview with Erick Barnes, Professor of Sociology &
Criminal Justice, Univ. of Detroit Mercy (Nov. 21, 2012) (on file with Hofstra Law Review). The
Valhalla Effect, a theory introduced by Professors Barnes and Homant, frames Miller's concept of
fate through the ancient Norse myth of Valhalla-the "hall of the fallen." Id.; see Valhalla, 12 THE
NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 245 (15th ed. 2010). Professors Barnes and Homant note that,
like the mythical Norse heroes who died valiantly in battle and were rewarded with a place in
Valhalla, gang members' notions of fate drive their decisions to "go down fighting"-as in the
context of "suicide by cop"--with the belief that they, too, will be forever remembered as heroes.
See Telephone Interview with Erick Barnes, supra. For an example of how the fate focal concern
can be expressed through social media, see Crimesider Staff, Eric Ramsey, Mich. Rape Suspect,
Reportedly Posted He Was "'About to Get Shot" Before Being Killed by Police, CBS NEWS
(Jan. 21, 2013, 10:37 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57564965-504083/
eric-ramsey-mich-rape-suspect-reportedly-posted-he-was-about-to-get-shot-before-being-killed-bypolice (reporting that a rape suspect utilized his social media account to exhibit his intent to go
down fighting by engaging police in a suicidal gun battle-the purest example of the Valhalla
Effect).
75. See Miller, supra note 18, at 11 (discussing how fate is related to excitement, which
involves high risk activity including fighting).
76. See THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 11, 41-42; Gutierrez, supra note 2.
77. See, e.g., Van Namen, supra note 6, at 565; Emily Gogolak, Inside the Weird World of
Tracking
Gang
Members
Social
Media,
ATLANTIC
(July
27,
2012),
http://www.theatlanticcities.com/neighborhoods/2012/07/inside-weird-world-tracking-gangs-socialmedia/2734; see also, e.g., THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 41-42 (attributing recruitment
efforts via social media, in part, to a recent increase in gang membership across the United States);
Tom Hays, NYPD Is Watching Facebook to Fight Gang Bloodshed, NBC NEWS (Oct. 2, 2012,
6:24 PM), http://www.nbcnews.contechnology/technolog/nypd-watching-facebook-fight-gangbloodshed-6239746 ("'Rockstarz up 3-0,' one suspect boasted - a reference to the body count from
a bloody turf war between [two] Brooklyn gangs .... ").
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agencies.78 Authorities have even created specific training manuals to
instruct agents on how to lawfully obtain information from social
media accounts.7 9
Though information and scholarly commentary on this issue is
scarce, a recent study compiled specific data on the presence of street
gangs on both Facebook and Twitter.80 The results, displayed in the
tables below, are startling. 8' Each of these accounts may exhibit majorly
detrimental gang activities, such as intimidating rival gangs and gang
members, planning future gang-crimes, and, of course, recruitment of
new members, which ensures the perpetuity of the gang.
Table 183
Gang Name

No. of Twitter Profiles

No. of Followers

Bloods
Hells Angels
Latin Kings
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-

9
24
22
21

13,411
6823
3303

.47,171.

13)

Crips
Almighty Vice Lord
Nation
Shower Posse
Indian Posse
18th Street
Wah Ching

12
6

3657
402

3
2
1
1

155
997
205
32

78. See, e.g., Hays, supra note 77 (noting the increased use of Facebook by the New York
Police Department and New York prosecutors to investigate, prosecute, and convict gang members,
and the countervailing privacy interests related to such surveillance efforts).
79. See, e.g., Obtaining and Using Evidence, supranote 3.
80. See Drcary-Hrtu & Morselli, supra note 18, at 878, 880, 882-86.
81. See id. at 882-86; infra tables 1-2.
82. See Ddcary-Htu & Morselli, supra note 18, at 884-87 & tbls.1-2.
83. Id. at 885 & tbl.2.
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Table 284
Gang Name

No. of Facebook
Pages/Groups

No. of Facebook
Fans/Members

Hells Angels

36
38

14,775
4598
1993
5923

(2010)
Crips
Bloods
i Mara
Salvatrucha

(MS-

39
45

No. of Facebook
Fans/Members
(2011)
42,811
5457
3497
1454

....

Latin Kings

18th Street_
Almighty
Vice Lord
Nation
Indian Posse
Wah Ching
I Shower Posse

1255
93
555

727

1003

N/A

426

6
297

100
53

527

As anyone can clearly see from the data, gang prevalence on the
Intemet and social media is substantial.85 What is scarier is the speed
ir
with which online gang activities are rising. 86Ths
This migration
of gang
8
7
presence to the Internet is not without explanation. Indeed, it makes
perfect sense that gangs would want to expand their activities to the
Intemet. s8 Gangs are constantly trying to grow their illegal operations,
spread their criminality, and, perhaps most importantly, increase their
memberships.8 9 Social media networks and the Internet can facilitate
these processes more efficiently than traditional methods. 90
Today, Facebook alone boasts more than one billion users.9 It has
become commonplace for citizens and businesses to create online
84. Id.at883&tbl.l.
85. See id.; supra tables 1-2.
86. See Ddcary-Hdtu & Morselli, supra note 18, at 883. For example, the Hells Angels nearly
tripled its Facebook membership in just one year. Id.
87. See infra text accompanying notes 88-95.
88. See Miller, supra note 18, at 17 (explaining that gang activity is driven by core gang
values); supra Part fl.A (discussing how the protection of core gang values now requires Internet
activity).
89. See Miller, supra note 18, at 17 (elucidating that the intention of gangs is to commit
crimes and that they tend to "recruit from the most 'able' members of the community").
90. See THREAT AssESSMENT, supra note 2, at 41-42.
91. Barbara Ortutay, Facebook Tops 1 Billion Users, USA TODAY (Oct. 4, 2012, 4:44 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2012/10/04/facebook-tops-1 -billion-users/1612613.
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personas in an effort to express themselves, advertise, or conduct
business.92 Indeed, nearly every facet of American society is "harnessing
the power of social [media] to their advantage," including normative
social groups and commercial enterprises.9 3 If one views a gang as a
business, it is not hard to imagine why gangs and their members
(employees) have migrated to social media. 94 This is particularly so
when viewed in light of Miller's focal concerns. 95
III. UNREGULATED SOCIAL MEDIA INVESTIGATIONS OF SUSPECTED
GANG MEMBERS AND ACQUAINTANCES RISK VIOLATING THE
CONSTITUTION'S PARAMOUNT PROTECTIONS OF PRIVACY

I am a generally law abiding citizen with nothing I can think of that
would require monitoring.., but I96wanted to know ifI was having data
collected about me andifso, what.
Gang-related speech on social media networks generally falls into
one or more of the following types of speech: (1) pure speech, protected
by the First Amendment; (2) incitement speech; (3) fighting words; and
(4) true threats, the latter three not being entitled to freedom of speech
protection.97 However, it is not clear whether law enforcement is,
perhaps unintentionally, ignoring First Amendment safeguards with
respect to pure speech through its data-mining practices, which create
"digital dossiers" on suspected gang members based solely on speech
that should be free from censorship, prohibition, and punishment. 98 Here,
the data-mining itself is punishment. 99 And the government may not
92. See Van Namen, supra note 6, at 551, 555 & n.10.
93. Id. at551-52.
94. Compare id at 551 n.10 (indicating that businesses utilize social media to market and
promote themselves in pursuit of commercial success), with THREAT ASSESSMENT, supranote 2, at
41-42 (indicating that gangs utilize social media to advertise criminal activity, spread propaganda,
and attract new recruits).
95. See VITO & MAAHS, supranote 60, at 159; Miller, supranote 18 at 7-13; supraPart I.A.
96. David Harris-Gershon, NSA Rejecting Every FOJA Request Made by US. Citizens, DAILY
Kos (July 6, 2013, 4:48 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/06/1221694/-NSA-RejectingEvery-FOIA-Request-Made-by-U-S-Citizens# (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting a thirtysix-year-old U.S. citizen, Clayton Seymour, pondering what personal information the government
was collecting about him).
97. See infra Part lI.A.
98. See Daniel J.Solove, DigitalDossiers and the Dissipationof Fourth Amendment Privacy,
75 S.CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1083-88, 1095 (2002) [hereinafter Solove, Digital Dossiers] (defining a
"digital dossier" as a detailed collection of one's personal information, which is aggregated,
typically unbeknownst to the individual, by private corporations-and often shared with law
enforcement-essentially amounting to a "digital biograph[y]"); infra Part HI.A-C.
99. See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REv. 1934, 1934-37
(2003) [hereinafter Richards, Dangers of Surveillance] (urging Americans to "recognize that
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punish such speech. 0 0 Even though there is no statute specifically
addressing the issue, there is a pressing need for such a statute in order
to give guidance to the executive branch and create transparency.'01 This
will ensure that
the First Amendment is not slowly (and secretly)
02
away.1
eroding
Articulated well over a decade ago, Daniel J. Solove raised
concerns over the fact that private companies and other third parties that
compile digital dossiers can share citizens' so-called digital biographies
with law enforcement; however, we know today that the government
compiles digital dossiers of its own accord. 10 3 But, we know neither how
far such practices reach, nor the details of how such practices are carried
out. 10 4 Notwithstanding the distinct problem of secret government
surveillance, the government's independent creation of digital dossiers
exacerbates Solove's concerns for many reasons: namely, law
enforcement's resources are surely superior to those of third parties,
potentially increasing the level of intrusion into law-abiding citizens'
private lives, and the government's practice of collecting personal data
directly from the source obviates the need to comply with laws designed
0 5
to regulate government access to information held by third parties.1
Part III.A will articulate the protections of the freedom of speech
that are embedded in the U.S. Constitution, and the various exceptions to
those protections. 0 6 An understanding of these basic concepts is
necessary to recognize how and when gang-related speech on the
Internet can be punished, and when it should not be. 10 7 Part III.B will
transition from the freedom of speech to the related freedom of
association, which is integral to understanding how law enforcement's
surveillance is harmful" for many reasons-namely, its palpable potential to dilute constitutional
rights and "chill the exercise of our civil liberties"); infra Part IV.A.It is well settled that privacy is
one of the most basic and fundamental foundational doctrines of the Constitution and of U.S.
citizens' expectations and privileges. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ,

INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW (4th ed. 2011) (providing eight chapters of expert commentary on
privacy laws, and recognizing that emerging technologies present serious challenges to the
significant rights such laws were designed to protect).
100. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; infra Part III.A-B.
101. See infra Parts IIl-IV.
102. See infra Part IV.
103. See Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 98, at 1088-89 (asserting that "the type of
information collection that raises concern involves data gathered from dossiers maintained in
private sector entities"); see, e.g., Sottek, supra note 4.
104. See, e.g., Watkins, supra note 2 (conveying law enforcement's reluctance to discuss gang
activity on social media for fear of revealing its investigative techniques).
105. See Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 98, at 1088-89; see also Richards, Dangers of
Surveillance,supra note 99, at 1934-36.
106. See infra Part HI.A.
107. See infra Part I1I.A.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol42/iss2/9

16

O'Connor: Asocial Media: Cops, Gangs, and the Internet

2013]

ASOCIAL MEDIA

663

investigations, data-mining procedures, and subsequent prosecutions toe
too close to the line of violating fundamental rights.10 8 It will also
discuss why the lack of congressional guidance and oversight is
dangerous. 10 9 Part III.C discusses in detail the investigations of gang
members via social media, e-mail, and online avenues." 0 While the
scholarly literature and law enforcement's disclosures on the topic are
scarce, ll sufficient data suggests that a large number of gang
investigations are conducted using evidence collected from the
Internet. 12 It is not far-fetched to infer that the scope of the information
gathered is often overly broad, or, what is even more troubling, wholly
unrelated to a legitimate criminal investigation. 1 3 This Part clarifies the
108. See infra Part HI.B.
109. See infra Part II.B.
110. See infra Part 1.C.
111. See Ddcary-H1tu & Morselli, supra note 18, at 878, 880; Watkins, supra note 2 (noting
that "[r]any police agencies are reluctant to discuss the phenomenon" of gangs' expansion to social
media).
112. See Orenstein, supra note 13, at 196, 205-06, 212 (observing that social media holds
"obvious benefits for police investigations," and that courts often admit social media evidence to
establish gang affiliation); Van Namen, supra note 6, at 563-65 (citing several examples of
prosecutorial use of social media evidence to reveal associations and affiliations, and to convict
gang members); Yu, supra note 4 (asserting that "social media has become a mainstay in police
work"); see also IACP SURVEY, supra note 3, at 1, 3, 11 (reporting that 86.1% of surveyed agencies
used social media for criminal investigations, and 66.1% used social media for intelligence
purposes).
113. See, e.g., Yu, supra note 4 (revealing law enforcement's monitoring of suspect's "friends"
and "friends of friends," all of whom had no involvement in the underlying matter); see also Ellen
Nakashima, NSA Gathered Thousands ofAmericans' E-mails Before Court OrderedIt to Revise Its
Tactics, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2013, at Al ("For several years, the [NSA] unlawfully gathered tens
of thousands of e-mails and other electronic communications between Americans as part of a nowrevised collection method .... "); Sottek, supra note 4. Sottek criticizes the NSA's PRISM, which
had secretly collected over 200 million Internet communications per year from ISPs, without the
ISPs' informed consent. PRISM, a massive, once-clandestine surveillance and data-mining
program, "[c]ollect[ed] [personal information and private content such as photos, e-mails, audio and
video messages, and connection logs] directly from the servers of [ISPs]: Microsoft, Yahoo,
Google, Facebook, PalTalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube, Apple." Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, US.,
British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program,
WASH. POST, June 7, 2013, at Al; see also Ben Dreyfuss & Emily Dreyfuss, What Is the NSA's
PRISM Program? (FAQ), CNET (June 7, 2013, 11:44 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_357588253-83/what-is-the-nsas-prism-program-faq. Despite a recent decision declaring that certain
domestic NSA practices of "bulk collection of metadata" violate Fourth Amendment privacy rights,
it is disconcerting that the government was permitted to engage in such broad, secretive activities in
the first place, intruding on the privacy of thousands of unsuspecting, ordinary Americans without
the knowledge of Congress. Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0881, 2013 WL 6598728, at *1-7 (D.D.C.
Dec. 16, 2013); Bill Mears & Evan Perez, Judge: NSA Domestic Phone Data-Mining
Unconstitutional, CNN JUSTICE (Dec. 16, 2013, 8:52 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/16/
justice/nsa-surveillance-court-ruling; see also Nakashima, supra. The nature of such practicesconducted without the knowledge of Congress, and authorized by a secret court-insulates the
government's behavior from public challenge "because [the] details [are] shrouded in secrecy,
denials, and unassessable invocations of national security interests." Richards, Dangers of
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problem at hand and demonstrates why the proposed statute resolves the
issue, quelling any lingering concerns about constitutional violations. 114
A. Freedom of Speech
The First Amendment to the Constitution prohibits Congress from
passing any law "abridging the freedom of speech." 115 But there are
exceptions. 16 Generally, most scholars agree that the courts have carved
out six distinct categories of speech that exist outside the ambit of
First Amendment protection-therefore, speech that constitutes any
of these exceptions
can be constitutionally punished or censored by
7
the government. 11
First, freedom of speech does not apply to advocacy that "is
directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action. ' 118 Brandenburg v. Ohio 19 was a
landmark Supreme Court decision concerning a Ku Klux Klan ("KKK"
or "Klan") rally that was filmed by a Cincinnati television reporter at the
request of the KKK's leader, Clarence Brandenburg. 120 The televised
rally depicted Brandenburg in white, hooded Klan garb, using racial
epithets and threatening violence if the federal government did not cease
"suppress[ing] the white, Caucasian race.' 121 Based on these
Surveillance, supra note 99, at 1160-61; see Eric Lane et.al., Too Big a Canon in the President's
Arsenal: Another Look at United States v. Nixon, 17 GEO. MASON L. REv. 737, 771 (2010);
Richards, Dangers of Surveillance, supra note 99, at 1934, 1948 ("[S]ecret government programs
cannot be challenged until they are discovered."). In sum, the NSA circumvented the doctrine of
separation of powers. See U.S. CONST. art. I (vesting "[a]ll legislative Powers ...in a Congress");
id.art. lI(vesting "[t]he executive Power... in a President"); id. art. III (placing "[t]he judicial
Power of the United States... in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may... establish"); Sottek, supra note 4. The same secretive practices, and the same overbroad
results, may be underway with respect to federal or state law enforcement's online gang
investigations. See infra Part II.C. Likewise, such unregulated collection and storage of personal
data from gang investigations could violate the Constitution, as some of the NSA's conduct has. See
Klayman, 2013 WL 6598728, at *1; infra Part III.C.
114. See infra Part IIB-C; infra Part IV (presenting the proposed statute).
115. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
116. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are certain
well defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.").
117. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (holding that true threats are not
protected); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (explaining that speech that
is likely to incite "imminent lawless action" is not protected); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (finding
that prohibited speech includes "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting words').
118. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
119. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (percuriam).
120. Id.at 445.
121. Id.at 446 & n.1.
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documented acts, Brandenburg was convicted of advocating violence
under Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act, 22 and the Ohio appellate courts
upheld his conviction. 123 But the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and
overturned Brandenburg's conviction, holding that a state may not
punish abstract advocacy of force or law violation "except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action."' 2 4 This "incitement test,"
articulated by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg,remains in use to this
day, and speech that satisfies it is generally categorized as incitement
speech--one of the six major categories of speech that is not
protected by the First Amendment. 25 Indeed, speech that satisfies
the Brandenburg test
may be prohibited without running afoul of the
26
First Amendment. 1
Second, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the U.S.
Constitution permits Congress to pass laws that prohibit another type of
speech, one that is separate and distinct, yet closely related to

122. OHIO REV. CODE § 2923.13 (1958). The statute made it a crime to "advocate... the duty,
necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political reform," or to "voluntarily assemble with any society, group, or
assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." Id.
123. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444-45.
124. Id. at 447-49 & n.4 (reversing Brandenburg's conviction and explaining that all state
"[s]tatutes affecting the right of assembly, like those touching on freedom of speech, must observe
the established distinctions between mere advocacy and incitement to imminent lawless action," and
explaining that punishable speech must be directed at, and likely to result in, imminent lawless
action).
125. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 806-10 (17th
ed. 2010) (discussing cases that have applied the incitement test following Brandenburg); supra
note 118 and accompanying text. While the modem incitement test owes its conception to the
holding in Brandenburg, the Supreme Court had articulated essentially the same test nearly half a
century earlier, in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's progressive dissent in Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616 (1919). Justice Holmes opined:
[W]hen words are used exactly, a deed is not done with intent to produce a consequence
unless that consequence is the aim of the deed. It may be obvious, and obvious to the
actor, that the consequence will follow, and he may be liable for it even if he regrets it,
but he does not do the act with intent to produce it unless the aim to produce it is the
proximate motive of the specific act, although there may be some deeper motive behind.
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes further remarked: "It is only the present
danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the
expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned." Id. at 628. The "immediate evil"
discussed in Holmes's dissent is considered by many to be the source of the "imminence" element
of the modem test, elucidated in Brandenburg. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444-45; Abrams, 250
U.S. at 627; see also, e.g., Steven G. Gey, A Few QuestionsAbout Cross Burning, Intimidation, and
FreeSpeech, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1329-30 (2005).
126. See Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 447.
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O'Connor, a true threat encompasses:
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27

According to Justice

[T]hose statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals. The speaker need not
actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true
threats "protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence" and "from the
disruption that fear engenders," in addition to protecting people "from
the possibility that the threatened violence will occur." Intimidation in
the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true
threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons
with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death. 128

Thus, a true threat is not necessarily one that the speaker actually intends
to carry out, and it may not even be feasible to carry out, but, because it
is nevertheless made in a serious manner, and because it is deeply
disturbing to society, it may be punished, notwithstanding the First
Amendment. 29 Currently, there is a federal statute in place prohibiting
the transmission of communication indicating a threat to injure
someone. 130 Due to the reluctance of law enforcement to fully disclose
the nature of its online investigations,1 31 it is not clear whether
gang
132
members are investigated for violating this or similar statutes.

127. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08
(1969).
128. Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
129. See id.
130. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2006) ("Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any
communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of
another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.").
131. See infra Part I.C (explaining that the extent of law enforcement's use of online
investigation tools is unknown); see also David Harris-Gershon, NSA Rejecting Every FOL4
Request Made by US. Citizens, TrKKUN DAILY (July 6, 2013), http://www.tikkun.org/tikkundaily/
2013/07/06/nsa-rejecting-every-foia-request-made-by-u-s-citizens.
132. See, e.g., Hays, supra note 77 (noting the use of social media to investigate past acts of
violence, rather than threats of future violence). However, perhaps law enforcement could (and
should) be investigating potential online violations of true-threat statutes in order to prevent actual
violence. See Black, 538 U.S. at 359; Drcary-Hdtu & Morselli, supra note 18, at 885-86; Gogolak,
supra note 77; Gutierrez, supra note 2. Online gang speech often includes intimidation and
provocation of rival gangs through ridicule and direct insults, which generally fall under the
unprotected category of "fighting words," and, at times, contain "true threats"-specific threats to a
specific rival gang member-which society is disturbed to "hear" online. See Drcary-Hdtu &
Morselli, supra note 18, at 885-86; Gutierrez, supra note 2; Knox, supra note 3; supra text
accompanying notes 118-29. In such instances, the government may be basing investigations solely
on violations of these statutes when there is no credible evidence or "probable cause" to believe that
other criminality is afoot, as opposed to discovering possible gang affiliation and subsequently
gathering information on an unidentified subject and his family, friends, and acquaintances. See Yu,
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Another type of speech that the government can prohibit and punish
is speech that courts refer to as "fighting words.' 33 The Supreme Court
has defined fighting words as "those personally abusive epithets which,
when addressed directly and in person to the ordinary citizen, are, as a
matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent
reaction.' ' 1 34 According to the Supreme Court, such speech can be
prohibited and punished by the government because fighting words "by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace."'' 35 In order for speech to be characterized as "fighting
words," and therefore outside the ambit of freedom of speech protection,
' 36
the speech must be "directed to the person of the hearer."'
Furthermore, statutes prohibiting such speech must be "narrowly drawn
to define and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present
danger to a substantialinterest of the State.' 37
Violations of these types of statutes must "raise such clear and
present menace to public peace and order" as to constitutionally permit
punishment.138 And, like other freedom of speech exceptions, these
prohibitory statutes "may not unduly suppress free communication of
views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving desirable
conditions."'' 39 It is therefore clear that the freedom of speech is a
fundamental right that mandates strict safeguards against legislation
that censors or punishes speech. 40 The fighting words exception
is yet another example of the limited (and somewhat extreme)
circumstances in which speech can be prohibited, notwithstanding
constitutional protections. 141
In order for a state to punish citizens for fighting words, the
applicable statute must be narrow and specific, and can prohibit only the
most egregious violations-those that are likely to elicit drastic and
142
disturbing consequences, such as a violent response from the hearer.
But, unlike other types of freedom of speech exceptions, the hearer must
supranote 4; Knox, supranote 3; infra Part III.C.
133. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. Id.
135. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
136. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940).
137. Id. at 311 (emphasis added).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 308. Perhaps "other" views could include notions of gang sympathy or indications
of gang affiliation, association, or even full-fledged membership. See, e.g., Knox, supra note 3
(explaining that users of Facebook join groups online that espouse the views of gangs).
140. See Knox, supranote 3.
141. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,20 (1971); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309-10.
142. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 311.
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also be the subject of the "abusive" speech. 143 For example, if a member
of the Crips street gang posted a Facebook message generally insulting
the Bloods street gang, it would likely fall outside the scope of the
fighting words exception and could not be punished. 44 This insult would
not be directed towards a specific hearer,
and so arguably would not be
145
"in person" due to its online nature.
There might, however, be specific circumstances where a gang
insult made on a social media network could be considered fighting
words. For example, a Crip member ("C") could privately send a
message directly to a Blood member ("B"), disrespecting B and the
Bloods, and communicating in such an abusive nature that an ordinary
citizen would reasonably consider it inherently likely to elicit a violent
reaction.146 While the speech in this hypothetical is written, not oral, the
"instant" nature of the message, and the evolution of social speech
since the advent of the Internet, might satisfy the in-person
element of the fighting
words exception, as outlined by Chaplinsky v.
47
New Hampshire.1
Thus, such gang-related fighting words might be likely to incite "an
immediate breach of the peace," 148 as B in the hypothetical would
receive that message immediately after C sent it, and it was intended to
insult B, the hearer. Due to the focal concerns of toughness, autonomy,
and trouble, 49 B might immediately respond to C with a similarly
violent, threatening message, and might possibly begin to plan an in-

143. Idat309-10.
144. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16, 20 (finding that the phrase "Fuck the Draft" on defendant's
jacket, worn inside of a courthouse, was not a personal insult directed to any particular person
"actually or likely to be present," and thus did not constitute fighting words (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 302-03, 311 (overturning defendants'
convictions for breaching the peace for playing a phonograph record insulting the Catholic religion
in front of two Catholic men).
145. See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16, 20.
146. See Gutierrez, supra note 2. It is not immediately clear how a court would interpret
"ordinary citizen" in such a situation. It might be prudent for a court to apply an "ordinary gang
member" standard when analyzing the nature of the speech and its likelihood of inciting an
immediate violent response, due to the inherently different nature of gang members' "focal
concerns," particularly "toughness," "trouble," and "autonomy." See VITO & MAAHS, supranote 60,
at 159; Miller, supra note 18, at 7-13; supra Part II.A. But, perhaps the courts could apply the
traditional "ordinary citizen" standard and reach the same result; the gang-related insult might not
lead an ordinary citizen (that is, a non gang-member) to react violently, but the insulting Facebook
message might also contain traditional insults or abusive epithets that would alone be inherently
likely to elicit a violent reaction from an ordinary citizen. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
147. 315 U.S. 568, 571-74 (1942); see supra Part H.A.
148. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
149. See Vrro & MAAHS, supra note 60, at 159; Miller, supra note 18, at 7-13; supra Part H.A.
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person attack on C, C's friends and family, or other members
of the Crips. 5 °
However, there is a lack of regulation for the use of this type of
speech.'
The type of gang-member-to-gang-member interaction
described in this hypothetical is likely outside the scope of this Note.
The example merely illustrates the possibility of constitutionally
permissible statutory prohibitions (and related punishments) regarding
gang speech online. For the purposes of this Note, however, such speech
is just one of many types that social media users and non-users can
report to the network's administrator, who then evaluates52 it and may
discretionarily bring it to the attention of law enforcement.
Law enforcement may, upon inspection of such speech, whether
obtained through investigating a public post (with no warrant or
subpoena required) or a private message (obtained under statutory
authority, usually requiring a warrant or subpoena), begin a file on the
suspected gang members based on the gang-related speech.' And, as
outlined below, law enforcement will also begin investigating the lives
of that suspected gang member's family and friends, and friends of those
friends, resulting in large numbers of digital dossiers on unwitting and
innocent social media users. 154 It is conceivable that law enforcement's
investigations and digital dossiers will lead to offline investigations to
gather personal data, such as subscriber information, addresses, and
billing information-and, potentially, in-person surveillance operations,
as well. 55 These investigations are themselves unwarranted
punishments, 5 6 therefore, they should be carefully and narrowly
tailored, rather than arbitrary and overbroad.' 57
B. Freedom of Association
In addition to the freedom of speech, the First Amendment
implicitly provides for the so-called freedom of association, which
grants citizens the right to freely come together with other individuals
and collectively express, promote, pursue, and defend common
150. See supraPart H.A; supra notes 2, 43-44 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Knox, supra note 3 (discussing how Facebook does not prohibit gang threat
activity).
152. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
153. See Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2006); infra Part HI.C.
154. See Yu, supra note 4 (quoting a Cincinnati police lieutenant who stated that the police
department was "looking [on social media networks] at friends and friends of friends of the
suspects"); see also infra Part III.C.
155. See 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2006); see also Obtaining and Using Evidence, supranote 3.
156. See infra Part IV.
157. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971); supra Part HI.A.
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interests.' 5 8 It is well settled that a person's First Amendment right to
freedom of speech generally extends to speech conducted on the
Internet. 59 Therefore, since the freedom of association is an
unenumerated First Amendment
right, it, too, deserves protection in the
60
social media setting.
But, there are also exceptions to the freedom of association. Certain
laws prohibit membership in certain groups, but these narrow situations
generally apply only to groups advocating for the toppling of the U.S.
government.' 6 1 Still, even for statutes relating to something as extreme
as an attempted coup, 6 2 the government, according to the Supreme
Court, must prove an individual's specific intent to further an
organization's subversive goals in order to punish them for simply being
a member. 63 Generally, the case law on this topic focuses on situations
in which the entire nation's security is at risk, and typically involves
statutes relating to treason, attempts to overthrow the government,
and terrorism.164
For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B-Providing Material Support or
Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations ("Material
Support Statute")'---only applies to officially designated Foreign
Terrorist Organizations ("FTOs," singularly "FTO")-a designation that
excludes traditional street gangs. 66 However, the doctrine underlying
the Material Support Statute exhibits an important principle; that is,
when the government attempts to punish individuals for merely being a
member of a group, such punishment is highly regulated, strictly
scrutinized, and often requires proof of additional intent or acts that

158. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) ("In the
domain of these indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press, or association, the decisions of
this Court recognize that abridgement of such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably
follow ....
); see also JEREMY MCBRIDE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: THE ESSENTIALS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 18 (2005).

159. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
160. See id.; NAACP, 357 U.S. at 461.
161. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952 & Supp. V 1958) (prohibiting organization of a group
that advocates the overthrow of the government).
162. See, e.g., id.
163. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1961).
164. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006) (prohibiting the provision of material support to a
foreign terrorist organization); 18 U.S.C. § 2385.
165. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
166. See id.; BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS

(2012)

[hereinafter

FOREIGN

TERRORIST

ORGANIZATIONS],

available at

http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (explaining that the term FTO includes
sophisticated and politically-oriented terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaida and Hezbollah, and
excludes typical domestic street gangs, such as the Crips and the Bloods).
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than merely displaying one's sympathies or affiliations
amount to more
167
for a group.
The Material Support Statute illustrates that, even where national
security is at risk on a much larger scale than that posed by street gangs
and gang members, an individual is technically not punished for being
merely a member of the group, affiliating with the group, or having
sympathies for the group. 168 Rather, they can only be punished if they
provide "material support" to the group169-a group that, it bears
repeating, is a highly sophisticated and dedicated FTO aimed at total
destruction of the U.S. government and the effective annihilation of the
American people.170 At the same time, recent case law has held that an
individual may still be held liable, even if 7such support is intended to be
used for non-violent humanitarian causes.' '
Still, this First Amendment right does not apply when there are
countervailing interests that strongly outweigh the individual's right to
freely associate-such as the state's interest in protecting the community
or maintaining order. 172 Individual states have passed laws prohibiting
the loitering and comingling of gang members on public streets, despite
freedom of association implications. 73 However, judges and lawmakers
have been careful to note the rare and extreme circumstances that allow
state courts and legislatures to deprive even gang members of the
fundamental rights to speak and associate freely when the countervailing
interest extremely outweighs the gang members' interest in exercising

167. See, e.g., Scales, 367 U.S. at 229-30.
168. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 166.
171. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000)
(upholding the Material Support Statute in lieu of a freedom of association challenge, holding that
the contributor is punished for furnishing goods and services that can be used to support a FTO's
terrorist activities, not for expressing of the ideas of the supported group).
172. See, e.g., People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 601-02 (Cal. 1997) (upholding an
injunction against a state statute that prohibited gang members from being in view of one another on
the street or engaging in otherwise legal activities); Ed Bond, Freedom of Association-For
Gangs?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1997, at B 1.
173. See, e.g., Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 45-46, 51-53 (1999) (holding city ordinance
that prohibited criminal street gang members from loitering with one another in a public place
invalid because it was impermissibly vague, but recognizing the state's interest in combatting gang
activity and noting that the statute did not violate the First Amendment, but rather abridged the
liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause); Bond, supra note 172 (discussing the California
Supreme Court's validation of the police and prosecutor practice of serving orders on gang
members prohibiting them from standing on rooftops, carrying pagers, or being in view of one
another on the street because of the communities' interest in security).
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those rights. 174 And, even under such dire circumstances, not all judges
175
agree that the deprivation of such fundamental rights is warranted.
Thus, the freedom of association, though not specifically
enumerated in the Constitution, carries serious weight when balancing
the interests of the individual with those of the government. 176 The
association right may prevail, even when the government's
countervailing interest involves ensuring its continued existence. 177 But,
while simply being a member is not technically punishable, individuals
are prohibited from providing certain types of material support that are
often interpreted quite broadly to encompass even non-violent activities;
still, mere association
with, or sympathy for, an FTO is not prohibited by
178
the state action.
It is unsettling, then, that local and state law enforcement may
infringe on these very same rights when cavalierly investigating
suspected gang members, and-more significantly-their families and
friends.179 Infringement of these rights occurs when a citizens' privacy is
invaded by the government's data-mining and compiling of digital
dossiers without probable cause. 8 ° Some may argue that much of the
information law enforcement gathers is "public" in nature-and
available to any normal citizen-thereby failing to trigger constitutional
protections.'18 However, this Note asserts that: (1) the government often
174. See, e.g., Acuna, 929 P.2d at 620 (Kennard, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justice Joyce L. Kennard noted the following declaration of the California legislature in restricting
gang activity:
"California is in a state of crisis which has been caused by violent street gangs whose
members threaten, terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes against the peaceful
citizens of their neighborhoods." These activities, both individually and collectively,
present a clear and present danger to public order and safety and are not
constitutionallyprotected.
Id.(emphases added) (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (1999)).
175. See, e.g., id. at 623 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Stanley Mosk stated that:
No doubt Montesquieu, Locke, and Madison will turn over in their graves when they
learn they are cited in an opinion that does not enhance liberty but deprives a number of
simple rights to a group of Latino youths who have not been convicted of a crime [under
California's Street Terrorism Enforcement and Protection Act].
Id.
176. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461-62 (1958).
177. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000). It bears
repeating that a citizen is permitted to associate with, and even be a member of, an FTO in light of
the freedom of association, but that punishment is reserved solely for providing material support to
the FTo. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006); supranotes 165-71 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
179. See Knox, supra note 3; Yu, supra note 4.
180. See infra Parts iI.C-IV.
181. See infra Part IV. When a person's reasonable privacy expectations are not infringed,
constitutional protections, such as those extending from the Fourth Amendment, are not triggered.
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly exposes to
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obtains non-public information-for example, through national security
demand letters ("NSLs"), and Electronic Communications Privacy Act
("ECPA") 8 2 and Stored Communications Act ("SCA") 183 requestswithout establishing probable cause; 1 4 and (2) a normal citizen who
compiles another citizen's public information (such as posts and
pictures) is wholly different from governmental collection of the same
information-which will be stored in digital dossiers and law
enforcement databases, may potentially resurface at any time, and can be
used against the citizen in a prosecution. 85
C Law Enforcement Investigations
Nothing was your own except the few cubic centimeters inside
your skull.
86
- George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four
This Subpart will first discuss the procedures and policies of federal
and state investigations of online gang activity. 8 7 Next, it will discuss a
bill that, if enacted, will permit private entities to share personal
information collected from the Internet with government intelligence
agencies. 18 Finally, this Subpart will summarize the methods of
data-collection that law enforcement utilize when investigating gang
activity online, then discuss the risks to individuals' rights that surround
such practices. 8 9

the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."); see
also Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) ("Users would logically lack a legitimate
expectation of privacy in materials intended for publication or public posting."); Van Namen, supra
note 6, at 558-59 ("If the user chooses not to alter his or her default security settings on social
media, the profile remains open to the public, available for all to view; and a prosecutor could
access the information without infringing on a person's privacy expectations."). Public information
is freely discoverable, and certain social media posts, such as tweets, "may be... easily used by
prosecutors" where courts interpret them as "part of the public record." See Van Namen, supra note
6, at 562-63. But see Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 ("[W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." (emphasis added)).
182. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 U.S.C. (2006)).
183. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006 & Supp. 112002).
184. See David Kravets, Google Tells Cops to Get Warrantsfor User E-Mail, Cloud Data,
WIRED (Jan. 23, 2013, 5:29 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/01/google-says-get-awarrant/?cid=5468824; infra Part IV.
185. See infra Part IV.
186. ORWELL, supra note 17, at 28.
187. See infra Part l.C. 1-2.
188. See infra Part 1II.C.3.
189. See infra Part III.C.4.
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1. Federal Investigations
There are no federal regulations currently in place to ensure
uniform reporting policies among the various social media outlets. 90 It
appears that, despite the view that gangs ought to be eradicated from
social media for fear of inciting violence and recruiting new members,
the lack of reporting policies on certain websites allows gang activity to
remain online unfettered, leaving the accompanying evidence just
waiting to be gathered, analyzed, and stored by law enforcement.1 9
Thus, it may be in law enforcement's interest to allow online gang
activity, to facilitate the gathering of intelligence on gang members1 92
and, potentially, their families, friends, and friends of friends.
According to a U.S. Department of Justice ("DoJ") training
manual, 193 which was released pursuant to a Freedom of Information
Act 194 request, 95 law enforcement is statutorily granted the authority to
obtain incriminating evidence of gang crimes and individuals' gang
affiliations through undercover operations or traditional search
warrants. 196 Specifically, the ECPA provides the framework for
government seizure of electronic data. 197 Federal agencies, such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), may request from ISPs,
through NSLs, users' subscriber information, including the "name,
address, and length of service," as well as "local and long distance toll
198
billing records.'
Additionally, the government can obtain the Internet records of
American citizens without evidence of gang affiliation, or any criminal
activity, for that matter. 199 Former NSA contractor, Edward Snowden,
revealed that the NSA, for years, has been collecting Americans' online
data to be subsequently mined, analyzed, and stored. 200 While this Note
does not suggest that every law enforcement agency is operating on a
level of this magnitude, a parallel can be drawn between the NSA's

190. See Knox, supranote 3; supranotes 8-11 and accompanying text.
191. See Knox, supranote 3.
192. See id.;
Yu, supra note 4.
193. Obtaining and Using Evidence, supra note 3.
194. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
195. See Obtaining and Using Evidence, supra note 3.
196. See id. (noting that MySpace requires a search warrant for private messages or bulletins
less than 181 days old).
197. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711.
198. Id. § 2709.
199. See Sottek, supra note 4 (noting that NSA collection practices may gather incidental data
that belong to American citizens with no connection to terrorism); see also Obtaining and Using
Evidence, supra note 3.
200. See, e.g., Nakashima, supra note 113; Sottek, supra note 4.
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recently revealed data-mining practices and law enforcement's everyday
online gang investigations. °1
A presentation by the DoJ outlined several investigative methods
for collecting information from social media outlets.20 2 These methods
include: (1) undercover operations; (2) subpoenas; and (3) search
warrants, when they are required.0 3 A fourth method identified by this
DoJ presentation is obtaining special court orders pursuant to § 2703(d)
of the SCA. 2° Section 2703(d) "does not require agents to obtain a
warrant if they are seeking communications that are not in 'electronic
storage' with the provider of an 'electronic communication service' or if
they are seeking communications that remain in storage for more than
180 days. 20 5 Instead, the SCA requires only that government agents
present "specific and articulable facts" demonstrating "reasonable
grounds to believe" that the information they seek is merely "relevant
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. 20 6 Additionally,
subpoenas-which are sufficient to demand electronic records stored for
more than 180 days-are issued beyond the bounds of meaningful
judicial review, and generally require a showing of mere relevancy-a
lesser hurdle than the stringent probable cause standard.20 7 Typically, a
neutral judge does not approve-or even review-the government's
20 8
showing that Internet evidence is relevant when granting a subpoena.
Indeed, "[t]rial subpoenas are typically issued by a clerk of court (or in
some cases, an attorney); grand jury subpoenas are typically issued by
the clerk of court on behalf of the grand jury; and administrative
subpoenas are issued by administrative agencies with appropriate
statutory authority. 20 9 None of these methods involve judicial review.21 0

201. SeeinfraPartIV.
202. See Obtaining and Using Evidence, supranote 3.
203. See id. (indicating that search warrants are required when the information sought from a
social media outlet, such as MySpace, constitutes "private messages/bulletins less than 181 days
old").
204. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006 & Supp. I 2002); Obtaining and Using Evidence, supra
note 3.
205. Bellia & Freiwald, supranote 4, at 127.
206. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d); Be~lia & Freiwald, supra note 4, at 127-28 (explaining that the
standard for obtaining such court orders is lower than the Fourth Amendment's probable cause
standard, which law enforcement traditionally must meet-to the satisfaction of a neutral and
detached magistrate-before it can constitutionally seize a citizen's information for later use in
court).
207. Bellia & Freiwald, supranote 4, at 127-28.
208. Id. at 128 (citing William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive
Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 864 (2001) (equating subpoenas to a "blank check")).
209. Id. at 128 n.28.
210. Seeid
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For years, the NSA's actions were carried out in secret, absent any
congressional authorization or judicial oversight, save, perhaps, by the
secretive court created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 ("FISA"). 21' Today, the breadth and depth of law enforcement's
gang investigations are similarly surreptitious. 12 As such, it is
impossible to determine whether or not they are uncovering too much
irrelevant (yet, private) information.213 A citizen might innocently post a
photograph wearing gang-suggestive clothing, or otherwise express
sympathy for a particular gang or group.214 Although this thoughtexpression might be entirely benign, perhaps even made in jest, the
current lack of government oversight and internal agency regulations
permits in-depth, intrusive investigation of that citizen's entire online
activity. 215 This surveillance could even lead to an investigation of that
citizen's family, friends, and friends of friends.216 This unwarranted
invasion of privacy amounts to the punishment of speech-that is,
punishment for what may be characterized as thoughtcrime-which may
have detrimental, chilling effects on the freedom of expression.2 17
Disclosures from one free e-mail provider suggest that there are
large numbers of law enforcement investigations and data-mining
activities in general (that is, not specifically related to gang crime), with
the majority of the information requested leading to a search warrant that
is neither based on probable cause, nor information that is legally
relevant to an ongoing investigation. 218 David Kravets stated:
The data Google is coughing up to the authorities includes e-mail
and text-messaging communications, cloud-stored documents and,
among other things, browsing activity, and even [Interet Protocol]
addresses used to create an account.
In all, agencies across the United States demanded 8,438 times that
Google fork over data on some 14,791 accounts for the six-month
period ending December 2012. Probable-cause search warrants were
211. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885 (2006); see, e.g., Nakashima, supranote 113; Sottek, supra note
4.
212. See Ddcary-Hdtu & Morselli, supra note 18, at 880 (noting that there have been reports of
police monitoring social media, but law enforcement denies extensive use); Watkins, supra note 2
(explaining that police are reluctant to talk about gang activity on social media because they do not
wish to reveal their investigative techniques); infra Part IV.
213. See infra Part IV.
214. See, e.g., People v. Liceaga, No. 280726, 2009 WL 186229, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 27,
2009); Gutierrez, supra note 2.
215. See, e.g., Yu, supranote 4; infra Part IV.
216. See, e.g., Yu, supranote 4.
217. See ORWELL, supra note 17, at 29 ("Thoughtcrime does not entail death: thoughterimeIS
death.").
218. Kravets, supra note 184.
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issued in 1,896 of the cases. Subpoenas, which require the government
to assert that the data is relevant to an investigation, were issued 5,784
times. Google could not quantify the remaining 758.219
What is further troubling is that this data might only represent the
tip of the iceberg. The NSA, for example, has collected over 250 million
Internet communications per year, as of 201 1.220 Further, many of law
enforcement's data-collection practices are kept secret from the publicand from the other branches of government, as well.221 In fact, at least
one e-mail providers' top executives were allegedly threatened with
incarceration if they revealed the U.S. government's data-collection
practices.22 2 Kravets reported that:
Google's transparency data is limited as it does not include requests
under the Patriot Act, which can include National Security Letters with
gag orders attached. Nor do the data include anti-terrorism
eavesdropping court orders known as FISA orders or any dragnet
surveillance programs legalized in 2008, as those are secret, too. In all
those instances, probable-cause warrants generally223are not required,
even for customer content stored in Google's server.
Thus, there is clear potential for constitutional violations when
the federal government investigates gangs online.224 Investigations
by state law agencies fare no better with respect to well settled
225
privacy protections.
2. State Investigations
State investigations must comply with state law, as well as federal
law, as a state may only provide its citizens with protections that are
greater than or equal to those provided by federal law.226 Therefore,
federal law sets out the minimum of citizens' rights.227 But, the
delineation of these rights is not always clear, and, unfortunately, courts
have provided little guidance as to the admissibility of evidence obtained

219. Id.
220. Sottek, supranote 4.
221. Id.; see Nakashima, supra note 113.
222. Dominic Rushe, Zuckerberg: US. Government 'Blew It' on NSA Surveillance, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 11, 2013, 8:18 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/sep/11/yahoo-ceo-mayerjail-nsa-surveillance.
223. Kravets, supranote 184 (emphasis added).
224. See infra Part IV.A.
225. See infra Part HI.C.2.
226. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
227. See id.; see also KAMISAR ET AL., supranote 37, at 25.
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via online investigations-and this lack of guidance applies not only to
gang investigations, but to other criminal (and civil) actions.228
Data garnered from "social media sites presents a unique challenge
for [defendants] as well as the government, because information is often
maintained by third-party providers, and there is developing law that
treats certain information stored on social media websites as 'private'
and subject to [ECPA]. ' 22 9 For example, in Hubbardv. MySpace, Inc.,230
the court held that a search warrant served by state authorities on
MySpace to turn over account information, including the Internet
protocol address, the inbox contents, and sent e-mail, was sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of the SCA. 2 31 However, a California federal
court, in Crispin v. ChristianAudigier, Inc.,232 while acknowledging the
privacy settings of the user, quashed subpoenas seeking private
messages on Facebook and MySpace as being protected under the Stored
Communications Act.233
3. Sharing Private Online Information with the Government
Through CISPA
On February 12, 2013, President Barack Obama released an
executive order regarding Internet privacy, data-collection, and
cybersecurity. 234 The purpose of President Obama's executive order was
to "strengthen the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure by increasing
information sharing and by jointly developing and implementing a
framework of cybersecurity practices with our industry partners." 235 The
executive order was released, in part, in response to repeated cyber
intrusions of federal government agencies.236 Clearly, the cybersecurity
of the nation's critical infrastructure is of the utmost importance to the
nation's security, and, ultimately, its continued survival. 237 But, the
228.
229.
230.
231.

Murphy & Esworth, supranote 14, at 34.
Id.
788 F. Supp. 2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006 & Supp. 1 2002); Crispin, 788 F. Supp. 2d at 321, 324-

25.
232. 717 F. Supp. 2d 965 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
233. Id. at 991. It is important to note that, "[u]nder this developing law, a civil subpoena
would not be sufficient, or for that matter, appropriate to obtain 'private' information such as emails or instant message communications stored on a social media website or a private web-based email account." Murphy & Esworth, supranote 14, at 34.
234. Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg.
11,739 (Feb. 19, 2013).
235. Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, Executive Order on Improving
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/02/12/executive-order-improving-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity-0.
236. See id.
237. See Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed.
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possible consequences of this executive order could further infringe
upon the privacy rights of American citizens; one such consequence is
of the Cyber Intelligence Sharing
the recent re-introduction, in Congress, 238
and Protection Act of 2011 ("CISPA").
A version of CISPA was previously introduced in Congress in late
2011.239 Despite strong opposition from privacy-rights advocates and a
promise by President Obama to veto it, should it pass, the bill passed the
House of Representatives, though it ultimately died in the Senate-much
240
to the delight of civil rights groups and Intemet-privacy think tanks.
The new CISPA, introduced a day after President Obama's executive
order, is nearly identical to the original CISPA.24t
The stated purpose of the bill is "[t]o provide for the sharing of
certain cyber threat intelligence and cyber threat information between
the intelligence community and cybersecurity entities, and for other
purposes., 242 This proposed bill will eliminate the liability of-that is,
insulate from criminal prosecution or civil suit-any business that shares
customer or employee information with intelligence agencies. 243 This
Reg. at 11,739.
238. H.R. 3523, 112th Cong.; see Tony Romm, Rebirth of CISPA-But 'Concerns Haven't
Gone Away,' POLITICO (Feb. 15, 2013, 4:39 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/02/rebirthof-cispa-but-concems-havent-gone-away-87690.html (implying that the re-introduction of CISPA
was a logical consequence of President Obama's executive order). But see Michelle Richardson,
President Obama Shows No CISPA-Like Invasion of Privacy Needed to Defend Critical
Infrastructure, ACLU (Feb. 13, 2013, 1:48 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security(emphasizing
technology-and-liberty/president-obama-shows-no-cispa-invasion-privacy-needed
that President Obama's executive order did not specifically endorse CISPA-or even mention itthus suggesting that the re-introduction of CISPA was not a consequence intended by the executive
order).
239. See Josh Levy, Meet the New CISPA. Same as the Old CISPA., COMMON DREAMS (Feb.
18, 2013), https://www.commondreams.org/view/2013/02/18-5 (warning that "[t]he 'new' version
[of CISPA] is in fact identical to the original CISPA," which stalled in the Senate
in 2012); Michelle Richardson, CISPA Claws Back to Life, ACLU (Feb. 10, 2013,
1:54 PM), http://www.acu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security/eispa-claws-back-life
[hereinafter Richardson, CISPA] (referring to the new version of CISPA as an "encore
appearance"). Representatives Mike Rogers and Dutch Ruppersberger co-sponsored the original
version of the bill. See Romm, supra note 238. Their work on the bill was part of a collaborative
effort to "help the federal government and private sector share data in real time and better defend
against crippling cyberattacks." Id.
240. Romm, supra note 238; Matthew J. Schwartz, CIPSA Passes House: What's Next?, INFO.
WEEK (Apr. 27, 2012, 12:36 PM), http://www.informationweek.co.uk/govemment/policy/cispapasses-house-whats-next/232901107.
241. See Romm, supra note 238 (quoting Representative Adam Schiff as stating that, "[t]he
text [of the newly proposed CISPA] is largely the same as last year, and the concerns haven't gone
away" (internal quotation marks omitted)). CompareCyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act,
H.R. 624, 113th Cong. (Apr. 15, 2013), with Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, 78
Fed. Reg. at 11,739.
242. H.R. 624 pmbl.
243. Id. § 2(a) (declaring that, absent bad faith, "[n]o civil or criminal cause of action shall lie
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information includes employees' and customers' Internet usage, social
media activity, and e-mail content. 244 Likewise, intelligence agencies are
allowed to collect data from businesses as needed "to protect the
national security of the United States. 24 5
As with the previous version of CISPA, and, like most of the laws
on Internet privacy and data-collection, the new CISPA is vague. 246 It
lacks explicit language and does not guarantee that personally
identifying information will be redacted before private companies pass
along the data to the government.24 7 Furthermore, it permits the
government to use the information shared with it for any lawful purpose,
assuming it: (1) is not used for a regulatory purpose; and (2) is used for
at least one lawful purpose that is related to (a) cybersecurity or (b)
"protect[ion] [of] the national security of the United States. 248 These
ambiguities in the statutory language, like the lack of oversight of law
enforcement's gang investigations on social media, are dangerous. 249 It
is not difficult to imagine the possible intrusions of constitutionally
protected privacy rights-specifically, the rights to keep one's personal
thoughts and information private, and to freely speak and associate. 5 °
A suspected gang member, whose social media account was
brought to police attention solely through a network administrator, who
had previously instituted his internal investigation based upon a user's
report of abuse to the network-a report that could have been based
solely on an unreliable, unauthentic post or photograph-might also be
subject to the sharing of his data between the government and private
or be maintained in Federal or State court against a protected entity, self-protected entity,
cybersecurity provider, or an officer, employee, or agent of a protected entity, self protected entity,
or cybersecurity provider" for sharing information, using a cybersecurity system, or not acting on
such information received or obtained); see also Matthew J. Schwartz, CISPA Cybersecurity Bill,
Reborn: 6 Key Facts, INFO. WEEK (Feb. 14, 2013, 1:24 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/
security/cybercrime/cispa-cybersecurity-bill-reborn-6-key-fa/240148600 [hereinafter Schwartz, Key
Facts].
244. See H.R. 624 § 2(a); Schwartz, Key Facts, supra note 243.
245. H.R. 624 § 2(a).
246. See id For example, the stated purpose of the bill is to encourage and facilitate more
efficient communication of cyber threat information between government agencies and between
private sector entities and the government, but also includes the nebulous phrase "and for other
purposes." Id.
247. See id.§ 2 (requiring only that information be shared in accordance with restrictions
provided by the very entity sharing the information).
248. Id.The quoted text has been the subject of much criticism, and could be interpreted to fit
nearly any type of online investigation, of many types of suspected criminals-including gang
members. Richardson, CISPA, supra note 239 (criticizing the language, "to protect the national
security of the United States," as being "undefined and incredibly expansive" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
249. See infra Part IV.
250. See supra Part HA-B; infra Part IV.
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cybersecurity entities under CISPA.25' In fact, the government could
25 2
even share this individual's private Internet data with other countries.
Due to CISPA's vagueness, the extent of the information to be shared,
253
and whether such information is stored, kept, or destroyed, is unclear.
The government is not opposed to sharing American citizens' online
information with other governments, 254 and, du
due tto CISPA's liability
exemption clause, a suspected gang member (or, more significantly, his
innocent family, friends, and acquaintances) would have no available
legal redress for the resulting privacy intrusions, false prosecutions, or
the stigmatizing effects of the public embarrassment stemming from
such government conduct. 5
4. Putting It All Together
Thus, under current law, a suspected gang member-known only to
law enforcement through his social media network and related online
persona, 2556 who was brought to police attention coincidentally, and
where the only incriminating evidence is a photograph indicating
possible gang affiliation from his social media account-can be easily
identified through a NSL, the use of which has greatly expanded since
the enactment of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of
2001 ("USA PATRIOT Act").257 It is not hard to imagine that the
disclosed subscriber information can easily be used to obtain more
personal, intimate information 258-even information about family
members and friends, which could subsequently be shared with private

251. See Schwartz, Key Facts, supranote 243; supra Part HI.A.
252. Glenn Greenwald et al., NSA Shares Raw Intelligence Including Americans' Data with
Israel, GuARDiAN (Sept. 11, 2013, 10:40 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/ll/
nsa-americans-personal-data-israel-documents.
253. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
254. See Greenwald et al., supra note 252.
255. See Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 624, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013).
256. See Ortutay, supra note 91.
257. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56 (Oct. 12, 2001) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the U.S. Code); see National Security Letters, ACLU (Jan. 10, 2011),
http://www.aclu.org/national-security-technology-and-liberty/national-security-letters
(cautioning
that, subsequent to the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, law enforcement can "compile vast
dossiers about innocent people and obtain sensitive information such as the web sites a person
visits, a list of e-mail addresses with which a person has corresponded, or even unmask the identity
of a person who has posted anonymous speech on a political website").
258. See Van Namen, supranote 6, at 563-64; see also IACP SURVEY, supra note 3; Obtaining
and Using Evidence, supra note 3.
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companies providing 259
cybersecurity to critical infrastructure, if CISPA
becomes enacted law.
While such tactics are helpful for investigating and preventing gang
crime, and for the apprehension of gang members for specific crimes,
little is known about how often NSLs are issued for information on
suspected gang members who have not been linked to a specific
crime.26 ° More importantly, little is known about the scope of law
enforcement investigations of gang members and their families, friends,
and acquaintances. 261 There is no positive law authorizing such
investigations, limiting the scope and breadth of information to be
obtained, or providing procedures for the destruction of the collected
private information once an investigation is extinguished.26 2 Without
such a statute, it is difficult for the judiciary to review this ongoing
conduct.263 Thus, the potential for violations of the freedoms of speech
and association in this arena is great, as is the risk of chilling these
rights. 264 The government can still violate the freedoms of speech and
association, even if it is not violating a specific statute, as the breach
of a statute is not required for government actions to violate
the Constitution.265
IV. CLEARING THE PATH: CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTION Is NEEDED TO
PROHIBIT ARBITRARY DATA-COLLECTION

There is a lack of transparency with respect to law enforcement's
gang investigations that exploit social media networks.2 66 It is easy to
imagine information being compiled into digital dossiers on suspected
gang members for which the only probable cause is a photo or post
suggesting gang sympathies or affiliations, and the only "crime" being
suspected membership in a gang. 267 It is similarly easy to imagine that
this information could one day be shared with other government
268
agencies, private companies, and even other countries.

259. See H.R. 624 § 2; Yu, supranote 4.
260. See NationalSecurity Letters, supranote 257.
261. See supranote 212 and accompanying text.
262. See Murphy & Esworth, supranote 14, at 35-36 (discussing the Fourth Amendment as the
only limit on law enforcement's investigations of electronically stored information).
263. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
264. See supraPart Ifl.A-B; infra Part IV.
265. See Nakashima, supra note 113 (explaining that a NSA surveillance program was
unconstitutional despite having been authorized by Congress).
266. See supra Part II.C.
267. See supra Part HI.C.
268. See supra Part III.C.3.
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This data-collection is a form of punishment in and of itself, when
it is conducted without a proper warrant based on credible probable
cause. 2 69 Even in the rare instance that a warrant is issued, such issuance
may often be based upon probable cause that is, in reality, nothing more
than an unauthenticated social media post or photograph.270 While there
is not a statute directly on point that law enforcement must either
comply with or violate through its practices, this Note argues
that government data-mining practices themselves may essentially
constitute a violation of the freedom of speech, freedom of association,
or both-not to mention the chilling effects such practices may have on
these freedoms.2 71
Inherent in these First Amendment rights, and protections
embedded in other Amendments, is the unenumerated right to privacy. 272
269. See infra Part IV.A.
270. See People v. Beckley, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362, 366-67 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that the
trial court erred in admitting evidence of the defendant flashing a gang symbol on her MySpace
page because, "with the advent of computer software programs such as Adobe Photoshop 'it does
not always take skill, experience, or even cognizance to alter a digital photo' (quoting Parry, supra
note 13, at 183)). It is not hard to imagine someone hacking into a law-abiding citizen's social
media account and posting potentially incriminating pictures related to gangs and gang crime, or,
perhaps, creating a fake account about a real person, and posting gang related posts. See e.g., id.
More commonly, though, is the scenario in which an ordinary citizen posts something that appears,
either intentionally or not, to demonstrate a gang affiliation or full-fledged membership (for
example, a wayward youth, though not a gang member or a criminal, posts a self-portrait in a blue
bandana, displaying a hand signal in the shape of a "C"-the universal indicators of Crip gang
membership). See id. at 365-66. Whether or not this person is an actual gang member would be
difficult to verify simply from this social media evidence. Orenstein, supra note 13, at 207. When
addressing evidence gathered online:
Courts generally address four types of authentication concerns: (1) general lack of proper
foundation; (2) the possibility that the entire social networking page is a fake; (3) the
possibility that a genuine existing page has been hacked; and (4) the possibility that
someone has appropriated the site of another by obtaining the password through
friendship, phishing, or a computer left logged on and unattended in a place where third
parties could post in the owner's name.
Id. (footnotes omitted). While these concerns regard the admissibility of evidence at trial, this Note
argues that these issues can be problematic as early as the investigation stage. See infra Part [V.A.
The privacy of unknowing and innocent citizens is violated in these situations, and there is no
oversight by independent, aboveboard agencies; it is not known where this collected information
goes once an investigation based on a social media "tip" is deemed meritless-or whether such
investigations are halted once the person is no longer deemed a suspect. See supra Part III.C. Still,
the government can investigate this person (to an unspecified extent), as well as their friends and
friends of those friends, for evidence of criminality. Yu, supra note 4. But, there is nothing criminal
about solely being a gang member, so evidence of such alone is deficient probable cause, and, the
investigation and dossier-compiling is punishment because it invades privacy-social media
administrators are handing over to law enforcement private information without warrants at an
alarming rate, because the public information is still different when it is collected by the
government and the consequences can be much more severe. See infra Part W.A.
271. See infra Part W.A.
272. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-86 (1965) (discussing the constitutionally
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Justice Louis Brandeis succinctly summarized the principles underlying
the Constitution's unenumerated privacy rights, in his dissenting opinion
in Olmstead v. United States,273 a case that has since been criticized and
essentially overturned by the landmark case, Katz v. United States.274
The Court in Olmstead explained:
The protection guaranteed by the [Fourth and Fifth] Amendments is
much broader in scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook to
secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They
recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings
and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure
and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.275

Through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,2 76
the implicit rights to privacy found in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
have been interpreted as also extending to state citizens.277 These rights
are deemed incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, and, as such,
must not be invaded by state action-for example, state and local police
investigations-without due process of law. 278 Therefore, these

protected zone of privacy created by the penumbral rights of the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments); SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 99, at 941-43 (discussing privacy challenges to
NSLs based on the First and Fourth Amendments); see also U.S. CONST. amends. I, III, IV, V. One
could also argue that the right to privacy is additionally implied by the Sixth Amendment's right to
counsel provision, because that right, which attaches as soon as formal judicial proceedings have
begun, prevents law enforcement from deliberately eliciting incriminating information from a
suspect without an attorney present, absent a knowing, valid, and intelligent waiver of this
constitutional protection. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 4; Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,
206 (1964).
273. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
274. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
275. Olmstead,277 U.S. at 478.
276. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
277. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-86 (holding that the right to privacy in the Bill of Rights
invalidated a state statute under the Due Process Clause). The Seventh Amendment has been held
not to apply to the states. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211,217 (1916). The
Supreme Court has not yet determined whether the Third Amendment is incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment (and, therefore, applicable to the states); however, the Second Circuit has
held that it does apply to state citizens. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1982).
278. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-88 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting that the
concept of liberty in the Due Process Clause incorporates guarantees in the Bill of Rights that
contain "fundamental" personal rights); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
(emphasis
added)).
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protections should be extended to state citizens so that they can enjoy the
appropriate protections and safeguards.27 9
It is important to note that, while some of the mined information
may include public posts and photos on social media networks, network
administrators and ISPs can disclose more intrusive, truly private
information, seemingly without a warrant or a subpoena. 280 The
triggering evidence (that is, the tip) in these instances might be public
speech, but the end result is that personal subscriber information (and the
contents of private e-mails and messages) are mined, analyzed, recorded,
and stored in law enforcement offices and digital systems throughout the
United States. 281 This is especially troubling because the investigation of
a suspected gang member can further lead to the investigation of the
suspect's friends, families, and-more concerning-friends of friends;
all people who likely have no reason to suspect that they are targets of
government surveillance.282 Allowing law enforcement to surreptitiously
monitor and collect the detailed personal data of innocent and
unsuspecting citizens creates a perilous slope that could transform
Orwellian science fiction into a dreadful reality.283 Indeed, such
unjustified, unregulated, and undisclosed data-collection practices
could serve as precursors to a shift towards a totalitarian government,
not unlike the one harrowingly depicted by Orwell in Nineteen
Eighty-Four, but the government's present impetus is the dilution of
privacy rights that once provided the bedrock for our Constitution and
cultural identity.284
Additionally, law enforcement's intrusive practices 285 are, from a
policy standpoint, contrary to both American jurisprudence and society's
279. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at481-86 (majority opinion).
280. See National Security Letters, supra note 257; see also Obtaining and Using Evidence,
supra note 3.
281. See Knox, supra note 3; see also Obtaining and Using Evidence, supranote 3.
282. See Kravets, supra note 184 (explaining that Google requires probable cause warrants to
hand over the content of users' e-mails, but will hand over non-content portions of e-mail, such as
the "from," "to," and "date" fields without probable cause); Yu, supra note 4 (revealing that local
police departments watch social media websites at suspected gang members' "friends and friends of
friends" (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
283. Richards, Dangers of Surveillance, supra note 99, at 1934, 1948; Neil M. Richards,
Essay, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1132-33 (2006) [hereinafter
Richards, Privacy Project] (suggesting that, although it does not capture all of the nuances of realworld surveillance, the Orwell metaphor retains some validity as a tool to understand electronic
surveillance).
284. See ORWELL, supra note 17, at 28; see, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders'
Privacy: The FourthAmendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1325, 1327-45 (2002); Richards, Dangers of Surveillance, supra note 99, at 1937, 1949-56;
Richards, Privacy Project, supranote 283, at 1132-33.
285. See supraPart HI.C; see also ORWELL, supra note 17, at 28.
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expectation of a free state.286 The need for regulation in this area is great,
as is explained in more detail in Subpart A.287 Accordingly, Subpart B
proposes a federal statute designed to quell these serious concerns, while
still facilitating necessary online investigations of gang crime-thereby
balancing the protection of fundamental constitutional rights with the
national interest in keeping communities safe.288
A. Tottering on the Edge of Unconstitutionality
There are certainly situations satisfying the "imminent lawless
action" prong of Brandenburg which would permit the government to
use online speech to conduct intrusive investigations of suspected gang
members, collect data, and, if warranted, subsequently prosecute
suspects. 289 Law enforcement's use of social media to investigate crime,
where there is probable cause to believe a crime has been or will be
committed, must be permitted to effectively police and protect the
community. 290 The same is true for prosecutors' use of social media to
gather incriminating evidence against suspects for whom they are
seeking indictments, or who have already been charged with a crime.291
However, it is clear that these are not the only situations in which
law enforcement and prosecutors are using social media to obtain
intelligence.292 It is not inconceivable that many of the pictures, posts,
and messages collected by law enforcement also implicate nonsuspects.293 Based on the suspicion of a criminal act, law enforcement
entities may be compiling digital dossiers on countless social media
users as authorized by the ECPA and the expanded scope of NSLs under

286. See Declan McCullagh, Opposition Grows to CISPA 'Big Brother' Cybersecurity Bill,
CNET (Apr. 23, 2012, 4:31 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-57419540-281/oppositiongrows-to-cispa-big-brother-cybersecurity-bill (comparing CISPA to an ultra-intrusive surveillance
government, and suggesting that CISPA abridges constitutionally guaranteed freedoms).
287.
288.

See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.

289. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (per curiam) (1969); see, e.g., Watkins, supra
note 2 (describing a case in which gang members used Twitter to call a rival gang member a
"snitch," and planned a retaliatory attack for his alleged testimony, though police were able to use
online investigations to arrest three gang members).
290. See id. (discussing how gang investigations on social media help law enforcement to
crackdown on gangs involved in hate crimes).
291. See Van Namen, supranote 6, at 563-65.
292. See, e.g., Yu, supra note 4 (discussing the use of social media to investigate friends of
gang members not suspected of a particular crime); see also, e.g., Watkins, supranote 2 (discussing
the use of social media to identify gang associates and learn about their organizations, and stating
that law enforcement can "find out about people you never would have known about before"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
293. See, e.g., Watkins, supra note 2; Yu, supra note 4.
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the USA PATRIOT Act. 294 It is more troubling that these law
enforcement entities may be compiling digital dossiers based on the
mere suspicion that the target has an affiliation or association with a
gang-no matter how tenuous-or simply because the target harbors
sympathy for a particular gang or its values.295
While some speech on social media networks is certainly public in
nature, such as status posts or self-posted photographs (assuming that the
account-holder who posts is the actual person behind the computer
screen), the traditional freedom of speech exceptions cannot be fairly
applied to online speech.296 In the days of Brandenburg, if the police
were made aware of a type of speech that might fall outside the ambit of
First Amendment protection, they would likely conduct an investigation
to determine whether a crime was being committed.297 In situations
where the First Amendment did apply, and the speech could not be
punished, the investigation would end; the patrolmen would merely
stand by while the speech continued, or choose to leave the scene and
respond to other calls for assistance.29 8
But, the above scenario is something wholly different from gangmember speech made via social media. Today, when the police are made
aware of potential gang-speech online, they investigate-just as police
did

in

the

days

of

Brandenburg.299

However,

contemporary

investigations may include gathering the most intimate details about the
potential suspect, and details about his family, friends, and friends of
friends, including public information, such as photographs, lists of
hobbies, or even a timeline covering years of that person's activitiesand "private" information, obtained through the ECPA, the SCA,
undercover operations, and, perhaps soon, the CISPA, including
information such as addresses, billing information, bank records, phone
records, private message content, e-mail information, private online
294. See supra Part III. Here, the term "suspicion" represents a lesser standard than probable
cause, as investigations may begin merely upon the reporting of the activity by a third-party citizen.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 55, at 599, 736 (defining "probable cause" and
"suspicion"); Van Namen, supra note 6, at 552-53. In other cases, this "suspicion" could be
characterized as an even lesser standard of proof when a person may have committed a crime, or
may be an associate of a particular gang (that is, "a police hunch"). See Watkins, supranote 2.
295. See Watkins, supra note 2.
296. See supra Part H11.
297. See, e.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315,316-17 (1951).
298. See, e.g., id at 317 (noting that, initially, patrolmen "made no effort to interfere with
[defendant]'s speech, but were first concerned with the effect of the crowd on both pedestrian and
vehicular traffic," implying that if defendant's speech had not reached the requisite level of
incitement-presenting a clear and present danger-the police would not have intervened and
arrested him).
299. See supra Part III.C.
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journals, and so forth. 300 Rather than investigating, deciding whether the
speech remains protected by the First Amendment, and then moving on,
the police can virtually enter the minds of these alleged gang members,
and invade the privacy of their innocent friends and friends of friends.30 1
This is clearly relevant information, and a goldmine for law
enforcement when they discover actual gang members (and their
associations), when they are actually committing gang crimes-charges
can be brought, crimes can be prevented, and lives can be saved.30 2 But,
what is not clear is what law enforcement is doing for those situations
where the gang speech is not, in fact, criminal-when it does not fall
30 3
within one of the highly regulated exceptions to the First Amendment
and must not be subject to punishment or censorship. 30 4 Where is the
information stored and for how long? 30 5 More importantly, for how long
do the investigations continue, and at what point, if any, are they
abandoned-for instance, should it become clear that the tip regarding
the gang speech was frivolous, or the conduct did not amount to a
crime?30 6 Finally, does the investigation of a person's entire life
(including non-public information), which is based solely upon
purported evidence of gang membership, come dangerously close to
violating the freedom of association? 30 7 If it is not a crime to be a gang
member, why should evidence of mere affiliation (and not actual
criminality) be grounds for a criminal investigation? 30 8 This is
particularly relevant when such investigations, due to the nature of
society and social media generally, can uncover intimate details of that
person's life-and the lives of his friends and friends of friends-which
can be stored by police without statutory regulations or limitations, in
accordance with any number of different department-specific policies.30 9

300. See, e.g., Van Namen, supra note 6, at 564-65; Obtaining and Using Evidence, supra note
3; supra Part 11I.C.
301. See Van Namen, supra note 6, at 564 (explaining that users of social media publically
post what they feel and think on the public forum); supra Part III.C.
302. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
303. See supra Part II.C. That is to say, when the speech is not a "true threat," "inciting
speech," or "fighting words." See supraPart IhI.A.
304. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; supra Part HA.
305. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
306. See supra Part III.A.
307. See supra Part HI.B.
308. See supra Part I.C.
309. See supra Part III.C.
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B. Protectingthe Constitution While Investigating Gang Crime:
A ProposedStatute to Balance the Interests
To quell these serious and legitimate concerns, Congress must act.
This action should come in the form of statutes or other regulations that
require uniform reporting procedures for investigations of social media
accounts that would still allow evidence of gang-related crimes to be
reported to ISPs by ordinary citizens. 310 The ISPs would then be directed
to follow internal procedures and potentially notify law enforcement if
the evidence of a crime is credible; but, the ISPs' internal policies
must be clear-a statute can ensure that there is clarity and a degree
of uniformity across the internal procedures of various social
media outlets.3 1'
Because of the lack of regulation of these practices, and the
inherent potential for constitutional violations, this Note proposes a
statute that grants law enforcement positive authority to collect data
from social media if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has
occurred, or that there is a reasonable probability of imminent lawless
action; data-collection based solely on a user's mere affiliation or
association with a gang is prohibited by the statute, with other such
limitations and parameters as Congress sees fit. 312 State legislatures
should model their own state statutes after the federal law, choosing 3to
13
add any additional protections for its citizens as they, in turn, see fit.
Additionally, state attorney generals might choose to issue executive
orders directing agencies to promulgate policies, rules, and regulations
outlining the collection and storage of suspected gang members'
information obtained through social media tips. 3 14 Those regulations
should be as uniform as is feasibly possible.
The proposed federal statute-or executive order-which state
legislatures should adopt completely or with modifications in
compliance with the Supremacy Clause,3 15 follows this general model:
Social media network administrators and Internet Service Providers
shall collaborate and establish uniform reporting procedures with
respect to reporting suspected criminality, and include a simple
channel to indicate specifically the possible indication of gang crime
on the Internet. Such policies should also include specific criteria,
uniform across all networks, for evaluating alleged gang criminality
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

See infra text accompanying notes 312-13; cf supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying notes 312-13; cf supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
See supra Part iI.C.
See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
Cf supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; supranotes 226-27 and accompanying text.
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for credibility and authenticity, in making the determination whether to
report such accounts to law enforcement.
The purpose of this is requirement to prevent frivolous and
meritless investigations of unsuspecting, innocent citizens and their
families, as well as to preserve police resources, allowing for a more
effective use of police time, energy, and capital. Such policies should
be particularly specific when addressing reports of abuse merely
indicating an association or affiliation with a particular gang, and
shall include provisions for evaluators to use common-sense
when deciding whether to bring the user's account to the attention of
law enforcement.
Furthermore, law enforcement agencies shall establish similar
procedures and disclose them to the public, and to an independent
oversight committee. Additionally, law enforcement agencies that
investigate criminals (and suspected gang members) via social media
shall be required to publish annual reports on the statistics of such
investigations, without jeopardizing active investigations; as such, all
personal identifying information shall be redacted from these reports,
which shall include:
(1) detailed figures regarding the reports of abuse (i.e., tips) from
social media administrators, which led to:
(a) convictions;
(b) arrests; and
(c) dismissals;
(d) leads to evidence of unrelated crimes and their subsequent:
(i) convictions;
(ii) arrests and;
(iii) dismissals,
including the nature of the suspected/charged/convicted crime
listed above;
(2) the number and nature of such investigations which resulted in
no arrests at all, and the extent of information collected;
(3) details regarding how such information was obtained, gathered,
and stored; and
(4) whether it is has since been destroyed and if so, the details of
such destruction.
No law enforcement agency shall collect and store information on a
citizen indicating merely an affiliation with, association with, or
sympathy for a particular group or gang, whether criminal or not,
unless it has been determined by clear and convincing evidence that
such person is providing material support for this group, the evidence
reveals sufficient probable cause (to be determined by a neutral and
detached magistrate) that a crime has been committed or is likely to be
committed, or such evidence is likely to produce imminent lawless
action or fall within any other of the few, narrowly defined types of
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speech falling outside the ambit of First Amendment protection, as
promulgated by this Congress and the Supreme Court.
Courts would likely interpret this as comporting with the freedom
of association, and the statue should be upheld if challenged.31 6
Furthermore, the statute would create transparency and oversight and
help prevent constitutional violations, and would start the discussion
about how to best handle the issues discussed in this Note, by first
requiring disclosure.31 7 At the same time, legitimate national security
efforts will remain unhindered, and authorities will still be able to utilize
social media to investigate crimes under the statute.318 Requiring
disclosure and annual reports will help Congress best modify, amend, or
even repeal this statute in the future, depending on its results.3t 9
But, without such transparency and regulation, the public will be
deprived of the right to freely associate, and there is a real risk that law
enforcement will slowly increase the scope of its data-collection from
gang-affiliates to their families, friends, and friends of friends, compiling
personal information for "intelligence" along the way.3 20 These
regulations would ensure that this does not occur, while, at the same
time, afford law enforcement each of the tools necessary to prevent and
solve gang crimes.32 1 Without such a statute, law enforcement could
compile digital dossiers on social media users based on nothing more
than their affiliations with, or sympathies for, certain subculturescreating a slippery slope that could potentially lead to the inherently un32 2
American dystopia predicted in Nineteen Eighty-Four.
V. CONCLUSION

The lack of laws regulating online gang investigations is a problem
of monumental magnitude.323 While it is clearly in the government's
interest to actively pursue criminals by any means possible, gang
members pose a potentially problematic paradigm. 324 There is a
legitimate risk of Orwellian surveillance with respect to these data-

316.

Cf. supraPart lI.B.

317. Cf. supra Part W.A.
318. Cf supra Part iI.C.
319. Cf. supranote 113.
320. See, e.g., IACP SURVEY, supra note 3; Obtaining and Using Evidence, supra note 3; see
also Yu, supra note 4; supraPart IV.A.
321. See supra note 154 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 315-16.
322. See generally ORWELL, supra note 17 (depicting a dystopian future under an oppressive
totalitarian government); supra Part W.A.
323. See supra Part III.
324. See supra Parts H111.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2013

45

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 9

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:647

collection procedures, and while law enforcement practices must be
afforded a degree of discretion, they should not be given free reign to
scour social media for any connection or affiliation with any group or
association, whether criminal or otherwise.32 5 Social media reporting
procedures ought to be uniform, as well; such uniformity will allow
vigilant citizens to effectively report evidence of gang crime to
authorities and social media networks. 26
Like the lack of regulation, there is also a lack of scholarly
authority in the field.32 7 As the social media era treads on, and courts
increasingly deal with these issues, more scholarly attention is
warranted. This Note does not, in any way, condone gang crime or gang
membership; neither does this Note suggest that law enforcement is
purposely, or certainly, violating the Constitution. But, the risk of such
violations in the future is great, and the individuals' rights involved are
even greater.3 28
James R. 0 'Connor*

325. See supra Part IV.A.
326. See supra Part IV.B.
327. See supra Parts II-III.
328. See supra Parts llI-IV. "[F]or our system of governance to perform effectively, the
legislature and the citizenry must receive sufficient information regarding the actions, policies, and
intentions of government officials. The absence of sufficient information undermines accountability,
impedes rational decision making, and lays a foundation for misconduct, corruption, and waste."
Lane et al., supra note 113, at 771. There is a current lack of sufficient information about the
government's gang-related electronic surveillance programs, but it is clear that they can harm gang
members and ordinary citizens alike. See supra Parts III-IV. When we ignore this ignorance-and
blindly accept secretive practices as beyond constitutional bounds-we "fail[] to protect [our]
privacy rights, and permit[] their gradual decay," while we silently encourage the government to
"determine for itself the scope of its own powers." Ku, supranote 284, at 1327.
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